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 As performance measures based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
deteriorate in usefulness, information users are placing more reliance on alternative performance 
measures. Key performance indicators (KPIs) are a subset of these alternative performance 
measures illustrating industry-specific firm financial and operational performance. In this study, I 
investigate analysts’ demand for KPI-related information in earnings conference calls and whether 
managers adjust their decisions about voluntary KPI disclosure in subsequent earnings calls. Using 
51 KPIs for six industries, I find that after analysts request KPI-related information, managers 
increase both the likelihood and the intensity of their KPI disclosure in subsequent earnings 
conference calls. This effect is more pronounced when the firm’s earnings are less relevant, 
consistent with the supplemental role of KPIs to GAAP financial performance measures. I also 
find that the proprietary costs faced by the firm and the relationship between analysts and 
management (as proxied by whether the analysts are invited to ask the first questions during past 
earnings calls) matter when managers make KPI disclosure decisions following analyst demand. 
As the findings suggest a well-functioning demand-supply mechanism of KPI disclosure, I further 
explore whether financial analysts use KPI-related information to improve the quality of their work. 
I find a significantly positive association between KPI disclosure and the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. This effect is more pronounced when the KPI disclosure is driven by analyst 
demand. Collectively, my study highlights the role that analysts play in voluntary KPI disclosure 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
In recent years, along with the declining relevance and usefulness of financial report 
information (e.g., Brown et al., 1999; Lev, 2018), there has been a rise in the reliance of 
information users on alternative performance measures (APMs) (Cascino, 2016; E&Y, 2015). 
While the extant APM literature focuses on non-GAAP financial measures or environmental, 
social, and governance disclosure (e.g., Hirschey et al., 2001; Marques, 2006), CFA (2018) 
emphasizes the necessity to go beyond these measures and to “also focus on other alternative 
performance measures (APMs), including financial and operational key performance indicators 
(KPIs).” In this dissertation, I investigate analysts’ demand for KPI-related information in earnings 
conference calls and, following analysts’ information demand, whether managers increase their 
voluntary KPI disclosure in subsequent earnings calls. 
As a subset of APMs, Key performance indicators (KPIs) are usually contextual and 
industry-specific, illustrating different aspects of a firm’s core business operation. KPIs typically 
include operational performance measures and financial measures disclosed outside of the primary 
financial statements.1 For example, the “same-store sales” for the retail industry describes the sales 
growth of stores that have been open for a certain time period; and the “load factor” for the airline 
industry describes the efficiency of the firm’s use of passenger-carrying capacity. Prior literature 
 
 
1 As described by the SEC’s advisory committee on improvements to financial reporting (SEC, 2008), KPIs 
“capture important aspects of a company’s activities that may not be fully reflected in its financial 
statements or may be nonfinancial measures … by activity and industry.” 
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documents that KPIs are value relevant and indicative for longer-term performance (e.g., Amir 
and Lev 1996, Lev and Gu 2016).2  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that KPI disclosure carries strong economic significance. For 
instance, in 2018, the SEC penalized two high-tech firms, Constant Contact and Endurance, with 
a fine of $8,000,000 for their material misrepresentation of “subscriber numbers” in their voluntary 
disclosure (Clarkson and Matelis, 2018).3  In September 2019, JetBlue’s stock price dropped 
dramatically after disclosing a decreased forecast for “revenue per available seat mile” (Kilgore, 
2019). In a survey by Ernst & Young (2015), about 75% of the institutional investors find industry-
specific reporting criteria and KPIs beneficial to their investment decisions. 
Despite its economic significance, there is no regulatory requirement for KPI disclosure. 
Thus, the disclosure of KPIs is largely voluntary.4 To improve the usefulness of financial reporting, 
researchers, professional associations, and regulators alike have advocated in recent years for 
integrating and mandating corporate KPI disclosure (e.g., Lev and Gu 2016; CFA, 2018). The SEC 
(2016) has called for public comments on the benefits and costs of standardizing and mandating 
KPI disclosure. However, it is challenging to establish mandatory standards for KPI disclosure, 
since firms’ choices and calculation of nonfinancial indicators varies across industries, and, 
sometimes, even across firms. A potential path is to keep KPI disclosure voluntary and rely on 
market participants (e.g., analysts) to motivate firms’ KPI reporting (Barker and Eccles, 2018). In 
 
 
2 Consistent with prior literature, I exclude non-GAAP financial measures (NGFMs) and ESG measures 
from my definition of KPIs. Section 2.3.2 provides a detailed explanation.  
3 Constant Contact was acquired by Endurance in February 2016. 
4 Authorities and standard setters have proposed various KPI reporting frameworks and guidance (e.g., 
European Commission, 2017; AcSB, 2018; SEC, 2020); however, due to the context-specific nature of 
KPIs, the proposed frameworks focus on the disclosure principles but not on specific KPIs. Managers have 
much discretion in whether to disclose KPI-related information and to what extent in such disclosure.  
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light of this, it is important to examine whether analysts have influence on managers’ disclosure 
of KPIs in the absence of mandatory integrated reporting.  
Motivated by the necessity to understand the role played by financial analysts in KPI 
disclosure, my dissertation delves into the conversations between managers and analysts during 
conference calls. It examines whether managers increase their voluntary KPI disclosure following 
the demand from analysts in the past eight quarters.5 In practice, venues for KPI disclosure include 
press releases, the MD&A section of 10-K filings, earnings announcements, and conference calls, 
among others. In this dissertation, I focus on conference calls as they provide an interactive 
environment between analysts and firm management and allow researchers to regularly observe 
analysts’ demand for and collection of KPI-related information (Bushee et al., 2004). Moreover, 
using survey and field data, recent studies demonstrate that managers view conference calls as a 
vital channel to convey information and maintain good relationships with their investors and other 
stakeholders (Amel-Zadeh et al., 2019; Brown et al., 2019).  
My initial analysis of the sample illustrates a growing interest in KPIs among business 
information users in recent years. Using multiple sources (i.e., the I/B/E/S KPI database,6 the KPI 
literature, and various online articles), I compile a list of 51 industry-specific KPI terms for six 
industries (i.e., airlines, energy, mining, real estate, retail, and high-tech). 7  I collect 39,302 
 
 
5 Following Chapman and Green (2018), I choose a two-year horizon to capture normal business cycles as 
well as to improve the possibility of observing increased disclosure in case the manager takes some time to 
collect and prepare the KPI-related information required by analysts.  
6 The I/B/E/S KPI database provides analyst forecasts for industry-specific KPIs and actual values reported 
by firms in ten industries (i.e., airlines & transportation, banking & investment services, energy, insurance, 
mining, pharmaceuticals & healthcare, real estate, retail, technology, and telecommunication). I use the list 
of KPIs followed by analysts in this database to help construct the list of KPIs in my analysis.  
7 Appendix A shows my list of KPIs and their sources. Appendix B reports the construction process of my 
KPI list. Due to the coverage of I/B/E/S KPI database, the six “industries” may refer to sectors or subsectors 
with various sizes in Fama French industry classifications. 
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earnings conference call transcripts of 1,846 firms from the six industries and find that analysts 
ask about KPI-related information in about one-quarter of earnings calls. Moreover, as shown in 
Figure 3 Panel A, in the subsample of S&P500 firms, the average number of KPI-related questions 
posed by analysts increased from 1.26 in 2010 to 1.65 in 2018. 8  I then explore the potential 
determinants of analysts’ interest in KPIs. I find that drivers of such interest tend to be 
communication-related factors, such as the prior KPI disclosure by the firm, the total number of 
questions raised in the Q&A section, and the number of words delivered in the managerial 
presentation. In particular, when the number of analysts following a firm is higher, analysts with 
connectivity to firm management (identified by whether the analysts are invited to ask the first 
questions) are less likely to demand KPI disclosure, consistent with the connected analysts being 
less willing to share KPI-related information with other analysts. 
After obtaining an initial understanding about the demand for KPI-related information from 
analysts, I investigate my research question on the impact of analysts’ information demand on 
managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure in subsequent earnings calls. Prior literature suggests that 
managers have incentives to improve voluntary disclosure when market participants find the 
information useful in firm evaluation (Dye, 1985; Chapman and Green, 2018). Given the different 
information specialties of analysts and managers (Hutton et al., 2012) and the importance of 
industry-specific information in analysts’ professional knowledge sets (Brown et al., 2015), I 
hypothesize that after analysts express their demand for KPI-related information, managers 
increase voluntary KPI disclosure in their prepared presentations during future earnings calls.  
 
 
8 The number of firms holding earnings conference calls increased significantly from 2006 to 2010 and 
stayed relatively stable post 2010 (See Table 2. Panel B.) In attempt to illustrate time trend of KPI demand 
in a relatively consistent sample, I focus on S&P 500 firms from 2010 to 2018.   
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To test my hypothesis, I map analysts’ questions about KPIs in past quarters to managers’ 
subsequent voluntary disclosure of industry-specific KPIs during the presentation sections of 
conference calls. I employ both the existence of KPI disclosure and the intensity of KPI disclosure 
(i.e., the number of words covered by KPI-related sentences and the number of KPIs disclosed) in 
my analysis. I find an increase in managerial voluntary KPI disclosure following analysts’ demand 
for KPI information during the Q&A sections of earnings calls. This finding corroborates the 
impact of analyst demand on voluntary KPI disclosure.  
I further investigate a number of cross-sectional variations of analysts’ impact on KPI 
disclosure. Due to the supplemental role of KPIs to GAAP performance measures, I first conjecture 
that when a firm exhibits lower earnings relevance, there is stronger demand for alternative 
information from information users, and thus, it is more beneficial for the firm to satisfy the 
demand from information users by providing KPI-related information required by financial 
analysts. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that the analyst demand effect is more pronounced 
for firms with lower earnings relevance. Secondly, since KPIs are usually proprietary information 
used by managers in their internal analysis and decision making, I expect that managers’ increase 
in KPI disclosure following analyst demand is less pronounced when KPI disclosure incurs higher 
proprietary costs. Using firm-level product market fluidity from Hoberg et al. (2014) as a proxy of 
proprietary costs, I find a negative association between proprietary costs and the analyst demand 
effect. Moreover, due to the interpersonal nature of the analyst-management communication, I 
contend that managers consider their relationship with analysts when making KPI disclosure 
decisions. Specifically, I predict and find that when the analysts asking about KPIs have 
connectivity to the management (as proxied by whether the analysts are invited to ask the first 
questions in prior earnings calls), managers are more likely to increase their KPI disclosure.  
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 These findings suggest a well-functioning demand-supply mechanism of KPI disclosure. 
To further explore the role played by financial analysts in interpreting and processing KPI-related 
information, I investigate whether financial analysts use KPI-related information to improve the 
quality of their work. Specifically, I examine the association between managers’ voluntary 
disclosure about industry-specific KPIs and the accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
 Prior literature has highlighted the importance of industry-specific information among 
financial analysts’ information sets (e.g., Hutton et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2015). KPIs are an 
important subset of industry-specific information which are widely used by both managers and 
other market participants in their business analysis, prediction, and decision-making. However, 
few studies have empirically examined the impact of KPI disclosure on earnings forecasts. An 
exception is Simpson (2010), who focuses on the wireless industry from 1997 to 2007 and finds a 
mixed association between non-financial performance measures and analyst forecast errors. While 
Simpson (2010) relies on a relatively small sample, this study employs a cross-industry sample 
covering 51 industry-specific KPIs for six industries from 2006 to 2018.9 I find a significantly 
positive association between KPI disclosure and the accuracy of analysts’ subsequent earnings 
forecasts. My finding is robust for most industries (i.e., energy, mining, retail, and high-tech) in 
the sample except the two industries with the smallest sample size (i.e., airline and real estate).10  
 Moreover, I investigate whether the demand from financial analysts plays a role in the 
effect of KPI disclosure. I find that the effect of KPI disclosure on analyst forecast accuracy is 
 
 
9 The sample of Simpson (2010) covers only six KPIs for 51 firms in wireless industry. 
10 An alternative explanation for the insignificant results for the airline industry and the real estate industry 




more pronounced when the KPI disclosure was motivated by analyst demand. I then reconduct the 
test for individual industries; the result is only significant for high-tech industry, suggesting that 
the main finding is driven by the firm-quarters in high-tech industry. This is consistent with the 
financial analysts being especially important in facilitating the investors’ and other stakeholders’ 
understanding the innovative and complicated business models of firms in high-tech industry.   
My study contributes to the literature on voluntary KPI disclosure. While prior KPI 
literature focuses on the value-relevance of KPIs (e.g., Amir and Lev, 1996; Francis et al., 2003) 
and whether KPIs serve as leading indicators of future financial results (e.g., Behn and Riley, 
1999), few have examined the voluntary KPI disclosure decisions of managers. My dissertation 
contributes by exploring analyst demand as a potential determinant of managers’ disclosure of 
KPIs. In addition, I conduct a comprehensive analysis of KPI disclosure in more than 39,000 
conference calls for six industries, significantly extending the literature from single industry 
analyses (e.g., Amir and Lev, 1996). This dissertation also sheds light on the impact of voluntary 
KPI disclosure on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. It extends prior studies about analysts’ use 
of alternative performance measures to a large sample of 31,502 firm-quarters from 2006 until 
2018.  
 My study also contributes to the research on the role of analysts in corporate disclosure. 
Bradshaw et al. (2017, page 139) call for research on how analysts gather information and benefit 
firms and capital markets. Due to the difficulty in observing analysts’ behaviors, it is challenging 
to examine financial analysts’ information collection and evaluation activities, or even to 
empirically identify what information analysts use (Gibbons et al., 2020).  Thus, studies about the 
impact of analysts’ requests for disclosure are rare. An exception is Chapman and Green (2018), 
who document that analysts’ acquisition of forward -looking GAAP measures during conference 
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calls influences managers’ future disclosures. My study focuses on analysts’ information demand 
and collection for one of their most important inputs, the in-depth industry knowledge (Brown et 
al., 2015) such as KPIs. This dissertation therefore extends Chapman and Green (2018) by 
examining whether and how the interaction between managers and analysts plays a role in the 
voluntary KPI disclosures that are not available from the core financial statements. Moreover, my 
study highlights the importance of analyst KPI demand in information generation, processing, and 
dissemination in the high-tech industry. For the high-tech industry, after financial analysts ask for 
KPI-related information, the effect of voluntary KPI disclosure on analyst forecast accuracy is 
more significant. This suggests that financial analysts may improve the quality of their earnings 
forecasts by actively expressing their demand for KPI disclosure and incorporating the KPI-related 
information into their estimation of firms’ future performance.  
In addition, my study is of interest to accounting standard setters. Despite the need to 
integrate nonfinancial information into corporate reporting, it is challenging to establish mandatory 
standards for KPI disclosure because of the variation of firms’ selection and calculat ion of KPIs. 
By making an initial exploration of the role played by the analysts without mandatory integrated 
reporting, my study implies a well-functioning demand-supply mechanism of KPI disclosure 
suggesting that it may not be necessary to mandate and regulate KPI disclosure.  
The remainder of my paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of relevant 
literature. Chapter 3 examines the association between analysts’ information demand and 
managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure in subsequent earnings calls. Chapter 4 examines the 
association between managerial voluntary KPI disclosure and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy.  




CHAPTER 2  
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter reviews four streams of literature relevant to my dissertation: the value 
relevance of accounting information, the KPI literature, the literature about financial analysts, and 
studies about earnings conference calls. The first part of the review (Section 2.2) introduces the 
deterioration of earnings’ value relevance in recent decades and the potential reasons for this 
deterioration. The second part of this review (Section 2.3) begins with anecdotal evidence about 
the prevalence of alternative performance measures and follows with a detailed description of the 
definition of KPIs in this dissertation. After introducing the early-stage development in 
standardizing KPI disclosure, this section concludes with a discussion of the extant research about 
industry-specific KPIs. The third part (Section 2.4) reviews studies about financial analysts’ 
information acquisition and its impact on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. My review 
highlights the challenge in identifying the information requested and collected by analysts. The 
final part of this review (Section 2.5) introduces the conference call setting, which allows 
researchers to directly observe the information demand expressed by financial analysts.  
2.2 The Declining Usefulness of Financial Report Information 
Since the seminal work of Ball and Brown (1968) on the information content of earnings, 
both standard setters and researchers have made continuous efforts to improve the relevance and 
usefulness of financial statements. However, in recent decades, because of the rapid development 
of technology-based industries and the shift of accounting standards from the income statement 
model to the balance sheet model (Francis and Schipper, 1999), accounting standards and their 
ability to adequately reflect the economics have come into question. Different groups of market 
10 
 
participants are voicing dissatisfaction with the usefulness of financial reporting. A survey of 
CFOs argues that financial reporting is more like a compliance exercise than providing the most 
useful information to the users (Dichev et al., 2013). In a report in 2016, the CFA states that there 
is an information shortfall caused by the increasing irrelevance of financial reporting and that 
supplemental information is needed (CFA, 2016).  
Empirical studies also suggest the deteriorating usefulness and relevance of the reported 
accounting numbers (e.g., Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Lev and Gu, 2016, Chapter 3). One stream of 
the literature measures the usefulness of financial information based on the association between 
accounting numbers and annual stock returns or share prices. Researchers focus on the usefulness 
of these accounting measures in stock markets because investors are important accounting 
information users and the secondary stock market data are publicly available. Lev and Zarowin 
(1999) regress annual stock returns on earnings (cash flows) and the change of earnings (change 
of cash flows) and use the R-square to measure the usefulness of reported earnings (cash flows). 
Similarly, they estimate the usefulness of book value using the R-squares of the stock prices on 
earnings and book value. Based on the regression of the relevance measures on the time variable, 
they conclude that the usefulness of earnings, cash flows, and book equity value deteriorated 
during 1978-1996. Brown et al. (1999) argue that the relevance of earnings across different time 
periods is not comparable because of the “scale effect”.  After controlling for the scale effect, the 
authors find a decline of earnings relevance from 1958 to 1996. Although the length of financial 
statements has doubled in recent years (Dyer et al., 2017), Lev and Gu (2016, Chapter 3) 
demonstrate that the adjusted R-square of share price on six key financial measures (i.e., sales, 
cost of goods sold (COGS), selling, general, and administrative expense (SG&A), earnings, total 
assets, and total liabilities) has decreased dramatically from the 1950s to the early 2010s. As a 
11 
 
result, executives and investors increasingly rely on alternative non-GAAP and operational data 
for more relevant and timely information, such as the customer-related KPIs for firms in the 
telecom, Internet, and media industries (Lev, 2018). 
While most studies document the deterioration of earnings’ value relevance, researchers find 
mixed results for the usefulness of other accounting information. Some papers even argue that the 
increasing relevance of other accounting amounts has offset the declining usefulness of earnings. 
Collins et al. (1997) put earnings and book value into a single model to estimate stock prices and 
use the R-square to proxy the combined value relevance. This paper argues that while the 
usefulness of earnings has been declining from 1953 to 1993, the combined relevance of earnings 
and equity book value has not decreased. The authors argue that the usefulness of earnings has 
been replaced by book value because of the occurrence of special items, the prevalence of 
intangible investment, and the presence of more loss firms. Francis and Schipper (1999) test the 
relevance of earnings, assets, liabilities, and the book value of equity. The authors estimate a 
financial measure’s value relevance using two proxies: (1) the market-adjusted 15 months returns 
that could be earned if the financial measure was foreknown, and (2) the explanatory power of 
financial measures for market values. While the relevance of earnings is decreasing, they find an 
increasing usefulness of balance sheet and book equity value measures. Barth et al. (2018) examine 
the usefulness of 14 financial statement measures, from earnings and other common financial 
measures to the measures related to intangible assets, growth opportunities, and alternative firm 
performance measures (e.g. operating cash flow, revenue, special items, and other comprehensive 
income). Similar to prior research, this paper estimates value relevance based on the explanatory 
power of accounting measures for stock price. Instead of the traditional linear regression model, 
the authors employ a Classification and Regression Trees (CART) methodology to estimate the 
12 
 
association between measures and stock prices, which allows nonlinearities and interactions. The 
authors find that while earnings’ relevance is decreasing, there is an increase in the usefulness of 
intangible assets, growth opportunities, and other performance measures, and the trend offsets the 
increasing irrelevance of earnings in the analysis of integrated relevance. Especially, the 
performance measures play an important role in the value relevance of accounting information. 
Up to 2016, alternative performance measures are contributing the third-highest relevance, just 
below net income and equity book value. Although the definition of alternative performance 
measure in this paper is not consistent with the industrial KPIs in my study, Barth et al. (2018) 
shed light on the importance of relaxing the emphasis on earnings as the single performance 
measure. 
 Another stream of literature focuses on the short-term stock price volatility or trading 
volume to examine the informativeness of earnings announcements. Prior papers observe an 
increase in recent years of the information content of earnings announcements. Landsman and 
Maydew (2002) test the change of abnormal trading volume and abnormal stock return volatility 
from 1972 to 1998 and conclude that the information content of earnings announcement was not 
declining. Beaver et al. (2018) use the three-day cumulative U-Statistic to capture the market 
reaction to earnings announcements and find a significant increase of market reaction at earnings 
dates from 2001 to 2011. In their further exploration, Beaver et al. (2020) argue that the dramatic 
rise in market reaction on earnings announcement dates is driven by three concurrent information 
releases: management guidance, analyst forecasts, and the voluntary disclosure of items from 
financial statements.  
However, this increasing informativeness does not necessarily conflict with the deterioration 
of earnings’ relevance. As summarized by Butler et al. (2007, p183), the “intraperiod” or short-
13 
 
term observations are appropriate to indicate the informativeness of public announcements, while 
the long-horizon timeliness of earnings “captures the extent to which current earnings are 
explained by, or explain, current economic income.” Ball and Shivakumar (2008) explore the 
relationship between short-window and long-horizon stock returns. The authors use the 
explanatory power of quarterly earnings announcement window returns for annual returns to 
measure the importance of earnings announcement relative to annual total information. They find 
that a quarterly earnings announcement is only associated with about 1% to 2% of annual 
information incorporated into stock prices. Therefore, although the U-stat around earnings 
announcements is increasing, its low relative importance is consistent with the irrelevance of 
earnings. Lev and Gu (2016) employ a similar methodology to estimate the contribution of the 
three main information sources to the total information that investors use: annual and quarterly 
financial reports, firms’ non-accounting Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, and 
analyst forecasts. The authors state that only about 5% of the information used by investors is from 
annual and quarterly financial reports (Lev and Gu, 2016, Chapter 4), while investors’ use of non-
accounting information increased from almost zero in 1993 to more than 25% in 2013 (see Figure 
1 Panel A). In summary, prior papers have presented the declining relevance of traditional financial 
statement information along with a rise of information users’ reliance on nonfinancial information.   
Prior literature has explored the reasons for the deterioration in the usefulness of earnings and 
proposed three primary explanations: (1) the rise of intangible investments, (2) the development 
of accounting standards from the traditional income statement (matching) model to a balance sheet 
(asset valuation) model, and (3) the increase of loss firms. With the development of information 
technology, intangible investments, such as research and development (R&D), have become more 
prevalent and brought challenge to accounting standards. Lev and Zarowin (1999) document a 
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significantly lower earnings relevance for firms with more intangible assets. Core et al. (2003) test 
the value relevance of seven financial measures (e.g. book value of equity, net income, net income 
before extraordinary items, R&D expenditures, advertising expenditures, capital expenditures, and 
the change in sales) and find a decline of combined relevance from the prior period (1975-1995) 
to the “New Economy” sub-period (1996-1999). Researchers argue that the immediate expensing 
of intangible investments along with accounting standard setters’ abandonment of income 
statement model results in a mismatch between revenues and  expenses. Dichev and Tang (2008) 
document an increasing mismatch between revenue and expense for the 1,000 largest U.S. firms 
over the 40 years before 2003. In the regression of revenue on expenses, the authors observe a 
decreasing coefficient of contemporaneous expense and increasing coefficients of past and future 
expenses. While it is difficult to link the change in the revenue-expense relation to specific 
accounting standards, some research suggests that the prevalence of intangible investments is a 
determinant of the revenue-expense mismatch.  Donelson et al. (2011) identify the expensing of 
special items and their related underlying economic events (e.g. M&A, discontinued operation, 
revenue decrease, and operating loss) as the source of the increasing revenue-expense mismatch. 
In addition, Srivastava (2014) states that newly listed firms with higher intangible intensity account 
for the increasing irrelevance of earnings and the mismatch between revenue and expense among 
the population. In terms of the explanation of deterioration of earnings’ usefulness being due to 
the increase of loss firms, prior literature shows mixed results. Hayn (1995) and Collins et al. (1999) 
present a significantly lower earnings-return correlation for loss firms, while Lev and Zarowin 
(1999) find no significant result in their regression of earnings-return correlation (estimated R-
square) on the percentage of loss firms.  
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2.3 The Rise of KPIs and Related Literature 
2.3.1 The Rise of APMs 
Along with the declining usefulness of GAAP financial measures is the rise in the reliance 
of information users on alternative performance measures (APMs). Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that executives and investors are increasingly relying on alternative non-GAAP and operational 
data for more relevant and timely information (Lev, 2018). In a survey conducted by CFA, 84% 
of the investors indicate that they often use operational metrics to help them make decisions, such 
as firm valuation and risk estimation (CFA, 2018). A report prepared by the European Financial 
Reporting Advisory Group (Cascino et al., 2016) documents that professional investors often rely 
on non-GAAP performance measures because they regard such measures as more informative than 
net income about managerial performance and operating activities. As shown in Figure 1 Panel B, 
more than 60% of the information used by professional investors comes from alternative resources 
outside of financial statements (Cascino et al., 2016, Figure 6). Moreover, as described in Section 
2.2, Lev and Gu (2016) demonstrate that investors’ use of accounting information decreased from 
more than 10% in early 1990s to just above 5% in 2013, while their use of non-accounting 
information increased from almost zero in 1993 to more than 25% in 2013 (see Figure 1 Panel A).  
2.3.2 Definition of KPI 
This dissertation focuses on a subset of APMs, the industry-specific key performance 
indicators (KPIs), including the financial measures disclosed outside of the primary financial 
statements and the operational performance measures, such as “proven reserve” in the energy 
industry and “available seat kilometers” in the transportation industry. As shown in Figure 2 Panel 
A and B, both the CFA and the Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) classify performance 
measures into four categories: (1) GAAP financial measures — for example, net income; (2) non-
16 
 
GAAP financial measures (NGFMs) — for example, earnings before interest, taxes, and 
amortization (EBITA); (3) other financial measures — for example, same store sales in the retail 
industry; and (4) operational measures — for example, available seat kilometers in the airline 
industry. “KPIs” in this dissertation refer to the last two types of measures and differs from NGFMs. 
For NGFMs, I follow the CFA (2016) definition: NGFMs are “financial measures derived from 
adjusted GAAP/IFRS measures”. Figure 2 Panel C presents some examples from the CFA report 
(2016) to distinguish NGFM and other metrics, which is consistent with the scope of KPIs in this 
dissertation.  
I exclude NGFMs from my study for two reasons. Firstly, although the definit ions of key 
performance indicators (KPIs) are not unified in the literature, prior papers generally treat NGFMs 
and KPIs as two different concepts and study them separately (e.g. Lev, 2018; CFA U., 2015). In 
addition, while NGFMs are calculated based on accounting numbers and generally report a firm’s 
performance at the integrated level, financial and operational KPIs are usually contextual and 
industry-specific, thus illustrating in detail different aspects of firm performance. For example, 
“customer acquisition cost,” the average cost to acquire a new customer, is widely used by Internet 
technology firms as a KPI. While many start-up Internet firms focus on increasing their market 
share, it is important for both the shareholders and the outside investors to understand how costly 
it is for the firm to acquire each new customer. Secondly, I focus on managers’ voluntary disclosure 
of information in response to requests from information users. Since some NGFMs can be 
calculated by information users themselves from the financial statements, managers’ disclosure of 
NGFMs sometimes overlaps with a re-emphasis on the mandatory disclosure of information. Thus, 
I exclude NGFMs from the scope of this study. 
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Moreover, my definition of KPI is consistent with the CFA (2018) survey of KPIs, which 
emphasizes the necessity “to go beyond focusing on non-GAAP financial measures (NGFMs) and 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information and to also focus on other alternative 
performance measures (APMs), including financial and operational key performance indicators 
(KPIs).” KPIs in this dissertation differ from ESG information. While KPIs illustrate different 
aspects of a firm’s business and provide insight into the sources of firm value (SEC, 2008), ESG 
information focuses on the firm’s responsibility to the overall society beyond that of generating 
profits for shareholders (Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Flower, 2015). Thus, although prior research 
reveals that ESG disclosures are value-relevant (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004), I 
exclude ESG disclosures from my study since they are not likely to be used as supplemental 
performance indicators to GAAP financial measures.  
2.3.3 Calls to Standardize KPI Reporting 
While the disclosure of KPIs is largely voluntary, regulators and standard setters have 
realized the importance of KPIs and called for discussion about integrating KPI disclosure. In 2018, 
Richard Howitt, the CEO of the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), emphasized 
the importance of standardizing KPI reporting (CFA, 2018). The Canadian Accounting Standard 
Board (AcSB) states that information users consider performance measures not reported in the 
financial statements and the users ask for transparent disclosures of these performance indicators 
(AcSB, 2018). The SEC advisory committee on improvements to financial reporting (2008) also 
emphasizes that firms’ disclosure of “all key variables and other factors that management uses to 
manage the business would be material to investors,” especially the industry-specific measures 
and value drivers. Although there is no common standard to regulate KPI reporting, SEC (2008) 
emphasizes that firms should explain their calculation method of KPIs and be comparable with 
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their industry peers. In 2018, the SEC penalized two high-tech firms, Constant Contact and 
Endurance, with a fine of $8,000,000 for their material misrepresentation of “subscriber number” 
in their voluntary disclosure (Clarkson and Matelis, 2018). 
Some organizations have already started the regulation-setting process. In May 2018, the 
Governor of the Bank of Canada established an APM working group with other organizations.11 
The objective of the APM group is to develop sub-sector reporting standards for APMs in order to 
improve the quality of corporate disclosure. As stated by the group, “APMs are different from 
GAAP information because they are typically very sector-specific and, therefore, require the 
standard setters to know the subject industry in detail.”12 Most of the proposed KPI disclosure 
frameworks have been focused on disclosure principles but not on specific KPIs. In October 2018, 
AcSB proposed a framework for selecting and reporting performance measures after considering 
the feedback from managers, auditors, information users, and academics (AcSB, 2018). AcSB 
(2018) issued voluntary guidance for firms to enhance their KPI disclosure but did not delve into 
the specific KPI selection at the industry or firm level. While the SEC released guidance about the 
broad principle of KPI disclosure in 2020 (SEC, 2020), the Financial Accounting Standards 
Advisory Council (FASAC) of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have not reached 
a conclusion about whether to extend their role from financial statements to the reporting of 
specific KPIs (FASAC, 2016). Meanwhile, standard setters and regulators across the world are 
suggesting or requiring the disclosure of KPIs. For example, in 2010, the International Accounting 
 
 
11 The APM working group is comprised of the eight largest pension funds in Canada, the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board (SASB), the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG), the CFA, 
and an observer from the Bank of Canada. 
12 Quoted, with permission, from an internal reporting slide of CFA Societies Canada, provided by Richard 
E. Talbot and Thomas J. Trainor. 
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Standards Board (IASB) proposed a practice statement for management commentary and required 
firms following International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to disclose “performance 
measures and indicators (both financial and nonfinancial) that are used by management to assess 
progress against its stated objectives” (IASB, 2010: 15). Another example is that, in 2017, the 
European Commission issued a guidance on non-financial reporting but did not require disclosure 
of specific KPIs (European Commission, 2017). 
Despite the need to integrate nonfinancial information into corporate reporting, it is 
challenging to establish mandatory standards for KPI disclosures, because firms’ choices and 
calculation of nonfinancial indicators varies across industries, sometimes even across firms. 
Givoly et al. (2019) argue that the definition of each industrial KPI should be uniform and 
consistent among firms. However, even if the KPI definitions are regulated, it remains an open 
question whether KPI reporting should be mandatory or voluntary. SEC (2016) has called for 
public comments on the benefits and costs of standardizing and mandating KPI disclosure. 
A potential path is to keep KPI disclosure voluntary and rely on market participants (e.g. 
financial analysts) to motivate firms’ KPI reporting (Barker and Eccles, 2018). In light of this, it 
is important to examine whether analysts have influence on managers’ disclosure of KPIs in the 
absence of mandatory integrated reporting. An answer to this question would be helpful, allowing 
regulators to understand the potential substituting relationship between mandatory integrated 
reporting and the requests for voluntary reporting from information users.   
2.3.4 KPI Related Literature 
There are mainly two streams of literature on KPIs: the value relevance of industry-specific 
KPIs and whether KPIs serve as leading indicators of future financial results. For the former, Amir 
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and Lev (1996) investigate the wireless communication industry and find that nonfinancial 
performance measures (e.g. population coverage and penetration rate) are highly value-relevant, 
while the traditional financial measures are largely irrelevant. In addition, considering the 
combined value relevance, the authors argue a complementary relationship between financial 
information and the nonfinancial KPIs. Francis et al. (2003) conduct industry-by-industry analyses 
to test the superiority of industrial KPIs relative to earnings. Specifically, the authors focus on 
three industries whose “preferred” performance indicators are nonfinancial industry-specific 
measures (i.e. the airline industry with revenue per passenger mile, cost per available seat mile, 
and load factor measures; the homebuilding industry with value of new orders and value of order 
backlog measures; and retail restaurants with same-store sales measure); they, however, find no 
domination of the preferred KPIs over earnings in terms of value relevance. Trueman et al. (2000) 
focus on 63 Internet firms and find that KPIs specific to the industry (i.e., unique users and 
pageviews) provide incremental explanatory power for stock prices.  
Some studies show that industry-specific KPIs are leading indicators of future financial 
results. Rajgopal et al. (2003) investigate the relevance of an industrial nonfinancial measure 
(specifically, the order backlog in durable manufacturing and computers industry) to future 
earnings. They find that after controlling past earnings, the order backlog is still informative about 
future earnings. Behn and Riley (1999) find that in the airline industry, nonfinancial metrics, such 
as available ton-miles and ticket over-sales, are leading indicators of financial performance. 
Simpson (2010) focuses on nonfinancial KPIs in the wireless industry (e.g., customer acquisition 
cost, number of subscribers, etc.) and finds that some KPIs can predict the firms’ future financial 
performance, but analysts underact to the release of KPI information. Collectively, both streams 
of literature have highlighted the usefulness of KPIs as performance indicators and value drivers.  
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Despite the importance of alternative information, the extant literature provides limited 
insight into the determinants and consequences of corporate KPI disclosures. Related studies are 
generally conducted using European data with a relatively small sample size and short sample 
period, and the results are mixed. In addition, the measurement of KPI disclosure usually relies on 
the judgment of researchers without a specific list of KPIs. The insights provided by these studies 
are difficult to be generalized to a large US sample that I examine. Boesso (2004) documents that 
the firm size and industry are potential determinants of voluntary KPI disclosure based on the 
analysis of 72 firms listed in Italy and the US. Elzahar (2013) focuses on 103 UK firms and 
investigates the firm characteristics’ impact on voluntary KPI reporting; the author demonstrates 
a positive association between firm size and KPI disclosure but finds no results for other firm 
characteristics. Dainelli et al. (2013) analyze Italian data and argue that the number of KPIs 
disclosed in annual reports is positively associated with the firms’ profitability. Coram et al. (2011) 
explore the analysts’ use of nonfinancial KPIs through a verbal protocol study on eight financial 
analysts in Austria; the authors find that, on average, the analysts pay 28.3% of their attention to 
nonfinancial KPI information when they evaluate a medium-sized private retail company, and they 
rely more on KPIs when the financial indicators show positive trends. Elzahar et al. (2015) test the 
economic consequences of KPI disclosure issued by 102 UK firms from 2006 to 2010; the authors 
develop a measure of KPI disclosure quality based on the guideline of UK Accounting Standard 
Board (ASB) by manually checking the annual reports of the firms. Elzahar et al. (2015) do not 
find evidence for the economic impact of nonfinancial KPI disclosure and conclude that only the 
disclosure of financial KPIs matters.  
Givoly et al. (2019) extend the KPI literature to analysts’ forecasts of KPIs. Using the 
I/B/E/S KPI database, they investigate analysts’ forecast of 28 KPIs for firms in four industries 
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(i.e. the airline, pharmaceutical, retail, and oil and gas industries). After documenting the 
incremental informativeness of firms’ disclosure of KPIs to earnings and revenue surprises, the 
authors demonstrate that the KPI forecasts made by analysts are more accurate than their EPS 
forecasts, consistent with analysts possessing superior industry-level knowledge (Brown et al., 
2015). Moreover, after investigating the calculation details of same-store sales growth rate for the 
retail industry, Givoly et al. (2019) argue that the informativeness of KPI disclosure depends 
heavily on the consistency of the KPI’s definition; therefore, the definition of each industrial KPI 
should be uniform and consistent across firms. My study complements Givoly et al. (2019) by 
investigating analysts’ efforts in extracting KPI-related information and managers’ decisions about 
voluntary KPI disclosure. Specifically, by observing the communication between managers and 
financial analysts during conference calls, I examine whether analysts’ requests are associated with 
increased managerial KPI disclosures. Furthermore, I extend my study by testing whether the 
managers’ voluntary disclosure of KPIs is associated with improved earnings forecast accuracy 
provided by financial analysts.  
2.4 Analysts’ Information Acquisition 
 Analysts are important intermediaries between firms and investors. They collect, analyze, 
and disseminate firm-related information to market participants and enhance the efficiency of 
capital markets (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990). Furthermore, sell-side analysts evaluate the firm’s 
current performance, predict its prospects, and make recommendations to their clients to buy, hold, 
or sell the firm’s stock (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The literature of analysts started as a by-product 
of research on accounting earnings and stock prices when researchers used analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings to proxy expected earnings and to calculate unexpected earnings (Bradshaw, 2011). 
Subsequently, researchers focused on one type of the outputs of analysts, their earnings forecasts 
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(e.g. Fried and Givoly, 1982; O’Brien, 1988). Since Fried and Givoly (1982) concluded that 
analyst forecasts predict earnings more accurately than time-series models, researchers have turned 
to investigating analysts and their behavior such as the analysts’ incentives, the conflict of interest, 
and the mediating role of analysts in the capital markets. Bradshaw (2011) emphasizes that it is 
important to study analysts because of their important role as market information intermediaries, 
let alone their representation of general investors in capital markets. Thus, studying analysts’ 
information acquisition, processing, and outputs helps us understand how the capital markets 
function. Bradshaw, Ertimur and O’Brien (2017, page 139) call for research on how analysts gather 
information and benefit firms and capital markets. 
 Despite the importance of understanding analysts’ information acquisition, the extant 
literature provides limited insight into this issue because of the difficulty in observing analysts’ 
behavior directly. As a result, it is challenging to examine the information collection and 
evaluation activities of analysts, or even to empirically identify what information analysts use 
(Gibbons et al., 2020). Therefore, the literature on analyst information acquisition has focused 
mainly on modeling their behavior and qualitative analysis using surveys or interviews. 
 In the analytical literature of analysts’ information acquisition and communication with 
clients, Benabou and Laroque’s (1992) model indicates that analysts’ concerns for their reputation 
encourage them to provide faithful information to their clients. Morris (2001) challenges the 
conventional conclusion (e.g. Benabou and Laroque, 1992) by showing that when analysts have 
strong reputational concerns, they have incentives to distinguish themselves from analysts whose 
interest is not aligned with their clients’ interest. Thus, the aligned analysts tend to avoid sending 
information similar to the not aligned analysts. As a result, the aligned analysts may fail to provide 
the most fair and accurate information in their communication with investors. In contrast, Meng 
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(2015) builds an analytical model in a two-period setting, where analysts make a decision on 
information acquisition efforts, which leads to a difference in the accuracy of the outputs of various 
analysts. Meng (2015) argues that analysts can build their reputation by providing accurate 
information; thus, they do not necessarily avoid reporting specific information to signal themselves 
as aligned analysts. Therefore, all analysts have the incentive to acquire more (firm-specific, 
industry-specific, or macro-economic) information, and the analysts whose interest is aligned with 
investors are motivated to collect more information and provide more precise reports. These 
analytical studies highlight the importance of information acquisition in analysts’ processing of 
information. 
 Some survey and interview studies explore the “black box” of sell-side analysts and shed 
light on the importance of industry-level information. Brown et al. (2015) survey 365 analysts and 
conduct 18 interviews to investigate the inputs and incentives of analysts. They find that the 
industry-level knowledge is the single most valuable information in the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and stock recommendations and determines the analysts’ compensation. Brown et al. 
(2016) conduct surveys and interviews for buy-side analysts and conclude that, from the 
perspective of buy-side analysts, the most valuable functions of sell-side analysts are to provide 
industry knowledge and access to firm management. 
 In recent years, some papers have investigated the impact of nonfinancial information on 
analysts’ outputs. Simpson (2010) examines how firms’ nonfinancial disclosure affects analysts’ 
forecast accuracy for wireless industry. The authors employ a relatively small sample of 556 firm-
quarters for 51 firms in wireless industry and focus on six KPIs (i.e., number of subscribers, 
customer acquisition cost, average revenue per user, churn rate, market share, and minutes of use 
per subscriber). The author finds that while some KPIs (i.e., number of subscribers, customer 
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acquisition cost, and average revenue per user) are leading indicators for the firms’ future 
performance, financial analysts tend to underact to the release of KPI information. Simpson (2010) 
also concludes that when the firms provide more persistent disclosure of nonfinancial information, 
analysts provide more precise earnings forecasts. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) employ an international 
setting to investigate the association between voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy. The authors find that voluntary CSR disclosure is 
negatively associated with analysts’ forecast errors, and the effect is stronger for firms and 
countries with lower disclosure transparency. Moreover, Huang and Mamo (2016) document that 
analysts’ earnings forecast revisions are significantly affected by the tone of firm-specific content 
in media news and that the effect is stronger for firms with higher information asymmetry. My 
study extends this literature by comprehensively investigating analysts’ demand for KPI -related 
information, managers’ voluntary disclosure of KPIs, and the consequences of KPI disclosure. 
Specifically, in Chapter 4, I explore the association between information disclosure and the outputs 
of analysts after controlling for the potential endogeneity between analysts’ information request 
activities and managers’ disclosure decisions.  
 Review papers have called for direct analysis of analysts’ information acquisition activities 
(Bradshaw, 2011 and Brown et al., 2015). Some researchers have accepted the challenge of 
identifying and investigating analysts’ information acquisition from public and private sources. 
Gibbons et al. (2020) empirically test analysts’ collection of public information from EDGAR. 
The authors link EDGAR server records with the brokers to identify and link analysts’ assessments 
to firms’ filings. They find that both company characteristics (e.g. firm size, market-to-book ratio) 
and analyst characteristics (e.g. length of analysts’ career, the accuracy of analysts’ past forecasts, 
and so on) are positively related to the analysts’ information acquisition on EDGAR. Moreover, 
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accessing formal filings on EDGAR leads to positive consequences for the analysts, such as more 
accurate predictions and stronger market reactions. Soltes (2014) conducts a field study on analysts’ 
acquisition of private information through private interactions with a firm’s management. 
Following a large-cap NYSE-traded firm for one year, the author examines which sell-side 
analysts pursue private interactions with managers, when they do so, and why. He finds that the 
analysts engaged in private interaction have similar characteristics to those who engage in public 
interaction with management during conference calls (Mayew, 2008), such as following fewer 
firms, making forecasts more frequently, and having shorter past careers as analysts. Cheng et al. 
(2016) focus on analysts’ site visits to some Chinese public firms during 2009 and 2012. They find 
an increase in forecast accuracy following site visits and argue that site visits help mitigate the 
information disadvantage of non-local analysts. Klein et al. (2016) document analysts’ requests 
for non-public information in the healthcare industry by examining their access to information 
available under the Freedom of Information Act. Under the Freedom of Information Act, in 
response to analysts’ requests, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may disclose some of the 
non-public information of healthcare firms to the analyst. The authors test the pattern of the 
analysts’ requests for information and find that star analysts and analysts who make more effort 
(proxied by the frequency of forecasts and number of stocks covered by the analyst) are more 
likely to request firm-specific information from the FDA. In addition, they demonstrate that the 
market has stronger reaction to the recommendations made by the analysts in possession of FDA 
disclosure. However, as mentioned by Klein et al. (2016), a limitation of this paper is that it does 
not capture the specific contents of disclosure acquired by analysts and, thus, cannot 
unambiguously identify the information collected, analyzed, and disseminated in analysts’ outputs.  
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 Although the above papers use different settings to identify analysts’ information 
acquisition activities, due to data or technology limits, few of them have clearly identified the 
contents of the information collected. Thus, what specific information is requested and acquired 
by the analysts remains an open question. My paper sheds light on this question using the 
conference call setting. 
 My study focuses on analysts’ information demand and collection for one of their most 
important intelligent assets, the in-depth industry knowledge. As illustrated by the survey-based 
studies, industry-level information is one of the most important determinants of an analyst’s 
compensation (e.g. Brown et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2016). My study adds to the literature by 
observing and examining analysts’ demand for a specific type of industrial information, the 
industry-specific KPIs. 
2.5 The Conference Call Setting 
In recent decades, conference calls have been widely used as a voluntary disclosure channel 
(Jung et al., 2018). Firms regularly hold conference calls shortly after their quarterly earnings 
announcements. Since the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) in 2000, all 
conference calls are publicly accessible. Typically, an earnings call contains two sections, the 
prepared presentation by management and the Q&A section in which analysts communicate with 
managers publicly.  
To investigate the demand from financial analysts for KPI disclosure, I employ the setting 
of quarterly earnings calls for two reasons. First, conference calls provide an opportunity to 
observe the requests for, and the collection of, information by analysts (Bushee et al., 2004). The 
public disclosure channels of KPI-related information include press releases, the MD&A section 
of 10-K filings, earnings announcements, and conference calls, amongst other disclosure channels. 
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Conference calls are a public channel providing a regular interactive environment (i.e., the Q&A 
sections) between analysts and firm management. Therefore, adding to prior papers about private 
manager-analyst interaction (Soltes, 2014; Cheng et al., 2016), I conduct a large sample analysis 
based on the public conference call setting.13  
Moreover, recent studies have highlighted that conference calls are an important channel 
for firm management to disclose information and maintain good relationships with investors and 
other stakeholders. Brown et al. (2019) survey 610 investor relations officers (IROs) and find that, 
from IROs’ perspective, earnings conference calls are the most important communication channel 
to convey messages to institutional investors. Using field data, the study of Amel-Zadeh et al. 
(2019) demonstrates that managers make significant efforts to prepare their quarterly conference 
calls.  
A number of papers have examined analysts’ participation during conference calls and 
demonstrated that the dialogues between management and analysts generate and disseminate new 
information into the market. Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012) document that analysts’ 
participation in conference calls is significantly associated with the accuracy and timeliness of 
their earnings forecasts. Matsumoto et al. (2011) examine the intra-day stock return during the 
managers’ presentation and the Q&A section. The authors find that the Q&A section is 
significantly more informative than the presentation section, and the difference is higher when the 
firm has poor financial performance. Jung et al. (2018) state that when a firm has lower sell-side 
 
 
13 This paper focuses on KPI disclosure in conference call setting but does not exclude the possibility of 
KPI disclosure in other channels (e.g., press releases, the MD&A section of 10-K filings, and earnings 




analyst coverage and higher forecast uncertainty, buy-side analysts are more likely to attend the 
firm’s conference calls. Moreover, Cen et al. (2018) distinguish sell-side analysts and buy-side 
analysts and find that buy-side analysts’ questions trigger higher stock price volatility and higher 
trading volumes, and that the effect is even stronger when the buy-side analyst is affiliated with 
hedge funds.  
Some research suggests that the participation of analysts during conference calls may 
indicate their superior private information or good relationships with the management. Mayew 
(2008) documents that the likelihood of an analyst being allowed to ask a question during a firm’s 
earnings call is positively associated with the favorableness of that analyst’s past stock 
recommendation related to the firm. Mayew et al. (2013) further argue that analysts participating 
in conference calls potentially possess superior private information since these analysts provide 
more accurate and timelier earnings forecasts after a conference call relative to their peer analysts. 
Cen et al. (2020) use analysts’ early participation in calls as a proxy of their special access to 
management. Using the quasi-experiment of brokerage closures, the authors find that the 
connectivity to management is very valuable for an analyst’s career.  
Only a limited number of studies, however, have delved into the information content of the 
dialogue between managers and analysts.  A few researchers have explored management’s failure 
to directly answer analysts’ questions. Hollander et al. (2010) find that managers avoid answering 
questions when their disclosure cost is high, and their silence triggers negative market reactions. 
Gow et al. (2019) extend Hollender et al. (2010) by constructing a measure of “non-answers” based 
on linguistic analysis. They find that managers are more willing to answer questions when 
competition is low or when the firm needs to raise capital. Barth et al. (2020) further develop a 
dictionary to identify rejection, avoidance, and dodging under broad Q&A situations.  
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My study is closer to the work by Chapman and Green (2018) and Feldman et al. (2020). 
Chapman and Green (2018) examine analysts’ demand for forward -looking information about six 
common financial indicators in the Q&A sections and demonstrate that managers are more likely 
to disclose these measures in response to analysts’ questions in past earnings calls. Feldman et al. 
(2020) focus on the disclosure or discussion about order backlog during conference calls and find 
an incremental market reaction to earnings calls with order backlog-related contents, but their 
analysis does not distinguish the information demand expressed by analysts and the information 
disclosure of managers. My study extends prior literature by exploring the interaction between 
conference participants (i.e., managers and analysts) over time and examining a relatively 
comprehensive list of industry-specific KPIs. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter reviews research on KPIs, financial analysts, and conference calls. 
Since there is no unified definition of KPIs in the literature, I  follow CFA and the Accounting 
Standards Board (AcSB) and define industry-specific KPIs as the operational performance 
measures and financial measures that cannot be derived from the primary financial statements. 
This chapter also reviews the literature on financial analysts’ information acquisition activities. 
Distinguished from prior studies about analysts’ collection of general information, my dissertation 
employs the conference call setting to identify analysts’ demand for a specific type of industry-
specific information, namely KPIs. This dissertation comprehensively examines the analysts’ 
demand for KPI-related information, the managers’ KPI disclosure decisions, and the effect of KPI 





CHAPTER 3  
Analysts’ Demand and Managers’ KPI Disclosure during Earnings Calls 
3.1 Hypotheses Development (Hypotheses 1-2)  
3.1.1 Introduction 
In Section 3.1, I develop the first two sets of hypotheses based on the themes reviewed in 
the last chapter. In Section 3.1.2, I discuss whether managers adjust their voluntary KPI disclosure 
decisions following the information demand from analysts during earnings calls. I argue that the 
different information specialties between managers and financial analysts provides the opportunity 
for managers to learn from analysts’ information demand during conference calls and that 
managers consider both benefits and costs in their disclosure decisions. I develop hypothesis H1 
based on this discussion. Section 3.1.3 presents hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c to test whether the 
increase of voluntary KPI disclosure following analyst demand is conditional on the firm’s 
earnings relevance level, the firm’s concerns about their proprietary information leakage, and the 
relationship between analysts and management.  
3.1.2 Analyst Demand and KPI Disclosure in Conference Calls 
In this section, I investigate whether the interactions between managers and analysts play 
a role in firms’ decisions to make voluntary KPI disclosures. Prior studies demonstrate that 
analysts and managers have different information specialties, which provides an opportunity for 
managers to learn from analysts about what information is important and should be disclosed. 
Hutton et al. (2012) compare the accuracy of earnings forecasts of the two parties and find that 
analysts have the information advantage at the macroeconomic level and managers have the 
advantage at the firm level. My study extends the work of Hutton et al. (2012) to analysts’ potential 
32 
 
information advantage at the industry level: analysts may have better knowledge about the types 
of KPIs that are most useful for a given industry, and their demand for these KPIs may help 
managers make better voluntary disclosure choices.  
Moreover, managers have incentives to initiate voluntary disclosure when market 
participants find the information useful in assessing firm value (Dye, 1985). Good voluntary 
disclosure brings benefits to firms, such as higher firm value (Verrecchia, 2001), higher liquidity 
of the firm’s securities (Botosan and Plumlee, 2000), reduced information asymmetry (Narayanan 
et al., 2000; Shroff et al., 2013), lower cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Hughes et 
al., 2007), and lower litigation risk (Field et al., 2005). Especially, managers may benefit from 
satisfying the needs of analysts, since analysts in good relationships with management usually 
provide optimistic forecasts and stock recommendations for the firm (Libby et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, managers may not respond to the requests from analysts since reporting 
KPI-related information can be costly. One cost is that of preparing and revising the new disclosure 
(Beyer et al., 2010). In addition, since KPIs are generally highly proprietary and informative, 
managers’ KPI disclosure to their competitors may negatively affect the firms’ competitive 
position in product markets (Baloria et al., 2019; De Franco et al., 2016). Managers’ KPI disclosure 
to regulators additionally may lead to litigation costs since regulators can better understand the 
firm’s actual performance and verify the reported earnings (Skinner, 1994). Finally, managers’ 
current KPI disclosure to market participants may lead to future costs when the firm has to disclose 
negative KPI news due to the ex-ante disclosure commitment (Verrecchia, 2001). 
Additionally, I note two other reasons to expect no change or even a decrease in KPI 
disclosure during subsequent earnings calls. First, while conference calls are an important channel 
through which analysts express their information demand, managers may provide related 
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disclosure through other venues, such as earnings announcements, 10-K filing, and press releases. 
Therefore, it is possible that managers learn from past Q&A sections that some KPI-related 
information is needed by market participants but improve their future KPI disclosure in other 
channels rather than earnings calls. Second, due to the context-specific nature of KPIs, it is possible 
that analysts’ interest in KPIs does not represent persistent demand from the market, thus managers 
may not see the necessity to increase KPI disclosure. For example, analysts tend to ask firms in 
the airline industry about their cost per available seat mile (CASM) when the oil price is high, but 
the demand for CASM disclosure may dissipate in subsequent quarters along with the decline of 
oil price.   
Taken together, I expect that, on average, managers will actively respond to the demand 
from analysts for KPI-related information during conference calls and thus increase their future 
disclosure. My H1, therefore, is as follows: 
H1: Following the demand by analysts for industry-specific KPI information, managers 
increase their KPI-related disclosure in subsequent conference calls. 
 
3.1.3 Cross-sectional Variation in Analysts’ Effects on KPI Disclosure 
Next, I examine whether the increase in voluntary KPI disclosure following analyst 
demand is conditional on the firms’ consideration of the related costs and benefits; and whether 
the effects depend on the relationship between analysts and management.  
I contend that when a firm’s accounting information is less useful, there is a higher benefit 
to be derived from improving KPI disclosure in response to analyst requests. Prior literature 
suggests that when earnings are less relevant, information users tend to rely on other disclosures 
to supplement financial reporting information (Chen et al., 2002). An important part of analysts’ 
work is to understand a firm’s current performance and make forecasts. As mentioned above, KPIs 
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provide incremental informativeness and help to predict longer-term performance (e.g., Amir and 
Lev, 1996; Rajgopal et al., 2003). Thus, I conjecture that when the firm’s financial statements fail 
to provide enough useful information, additional information like KPI-related disclosure is 
especially valuable for analysts and other information users who consume analysts’ products. 
Since the benefit of voluntary disclosure is realized through stakeholders’ consumption of the 
information (e.g., Dye, 1985; Shroff et al., 2013), I expect that, for firms, the benefit of KPI 
disclosure is also more significant when their earnings are less relevant. Consistent with my 
conjecture, prior studies document that the prevalence of KPI disclosure has paralleled the growth 
of financial statement users’ concerns about the usefulness of earnings numbers (e.g., Givoly et 
al., 2019; Lev and Gu, 2016). Therefore, my H2a is as follows: 
H2a: Managers’ increase in KPI-related disclosure following analyst demand is higher for 
firms with lower earnings relevance. 
 
I further examine whether the increase in managerial KPI disclosure is lower when the firm 
faces higher proprietary costs. I focus on proprietary costs since industry-specific KPIs are usually 
inside information used by managers in their business analysis, prediction, and decision-making. 
Managers tend to hoard information about their daily operations to prevent competition from their 
current and potential rivals (Dye, 1986; Graham et al., 2005).14 For example, “pre-opening expense” 
in the retail industry reflects the average cost incurred before a new store can open its doors for 
business. While managers need “pre-opening expense” to decide how many new stores to open 
 
 
14 As stated by Graham et al. (2005), CFOs avoid explicitly revealing their sensitive proprietary information 
even if that information can be partially derived from other sources. In the case of industry-specific KPIs, 
although some KPIs (e.g., the market share of high-tech industry) can be calculated by information users 
themselves, the managers still have incentives to avoid disclosing explicit values.  
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and the budget needed, they have incentives to hide this information to avoid their expansion 
strategy being copied by competitors. Thus, I expect the increase in KPI disclosure following 
analyst demand to be less pronounced when the firm is concerned about proprietary information 
leakage.  
H2b: Managers’ increase in KPI-related disclosure following analyst demand is lower when 
the firms’ KPI disclosure faces higher proprietary costs. 
 
Furthermore, I test whether the effect of analyst demand depends on the relationship 
between analysts who raise KPI-related questions and the management. Unlike prior studies 
focusing on analysts’ relationship-building efforts, I examine the impact of the analyst-
management relationship on managers’ KPI disclosure decisions. Therefore, following Cen et al. 
(2020), I focus on a manager’s recognition of her relationship with an analyst based on whether 
the analyst is invited to ask the first question in the Q&A section. Specifically, I consider a 
financial analyst to be connected to firm management if the manager invites that analyst to ask the 
first question in an earnings call. I conjecture that the effect of analyst demand is more pronounced 
when the KPI-related questions are raised by analysts with connectivity to management for two 
reasons. First, relative to other analysts, the connected analysts tend to have better knowledge 
about the firm since these analysts have more private information about the firm (Cen et al., 
2020).15 As a result, their questions about KPIs could be more relevant and more insightful in 
terms of the managers’ future KPI disclosure. In addition, since connected analysts usually provide 
more optimistic stock recommendations (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Kadan et al., 2009), 
 
 
15 As demonstrated by Cen et al. (2020), analysts with access to management make more accurate forecasts 
relative to other analysts. 
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managers have incentives to maintain their good relationships with these analysts by satisfying 
their disclosure requests. My H2c, therefore, is as follows: 
H2c: Managers’ increase in KPI-related disclosure following analyst demand is higher when 
the analysts posing the KPI-related questions have connectivity to management. 
 
3.1.4 Conclusion 
 In Section 3.1, I posit two sets of hypotheses to be tested in my empirical analyses. I present 
my first hypothesis in support of a positive association between analysts’ demand for KPI-related 
information and the managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure in subsequent earnings calls. I present the 
next three hypotheses to test the cross-sectional factors that may affect the effect of analyst demand 
during earnings calls. 
3.2 Data and Research Design 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 Section 3.2 describes my data and the research design for the hypotheses developed in the 
previous section. The section begins by introducing my KPI term list in Section 3.2.2 and follows 
with my sample construction process in Section 3.2.3. Section 3.2.4 presents the measures of 
managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure in their prepared presentation sections during earnings 
conference calls and Section 3.2.5 describes the measure of analysts’ demand for KPI-related 
information during the Q&A sections. I introduce my regression model to test hypotheses H1, H2a, 
H2b, and H2c in Section 3.2.6 and conclude with a summary in Section 3.2.7. 
3.2.2 List of KPI Terms 
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I develop a unique list of 51 KPI measures for six industries based on the industry-specific 
KPIs covered by the I/B/E/S KPI database, the related literature, and various online articles.16 I 
start with the full list of industry-specific performance measures in the I/B/E/S KPI database and 
exclude the KPIs of the banking industry.17 As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, the industry-specific 
KPIs in this study include the financial measures disclosed outside of the primary financial 
statements and some operational performance measures. According to my definition of KPIs, I 
exclude the performance measures that are available in financial statements (GAAP measures). I  
then refer to the literature and some online articles and add to my list the KPIs documented as 
value relevant. The resulting list contains 131 KPIs for seven industries.  
I then conduct key word searching across all the conference call transcripts held by firms 
in the seven industries covered by my sample and exclude the KPIs that have been discussed by 
managers (analysts) in less than ten (five) conference calls from my list.18 My final list of KPIs 
contains 51 KPIs for six industries (i.e., airlines, energy, mining, real estate, retail, and high-tech). 
Appendix A presents my list of KPIs and their resources. 
3.2.3 Sample Construction 
I construct my sample by first identifying the firms operating in the six industries covered 
by my KPI list (i.e., airlines, energy, mining, real estate, retail, and high-tech industry). Specifically, 
I determine the SIC codes of airline, energy, and real estate industries based on Fama-French 48 
industry classifications; and the retail and mining industries based on Fama-French 17 industry 
 
 
16 See Appendix B for details about the construction of my KPI list.  
17 I follow prior literature and exclude the banking industry from my sample since the financial firms usually 
have different disclosure practices and are generally excluded in studies about corporate disclosure (e.g., 
Chen et al., 2015; Kim and Shi, 2012). 
18 Appendix B presents my industry classification approach in detail. 
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classifications (Fama and French, 1997).19 I then follow Kile and Phillips (2009)’s optimal three-
digit SIC code combination to identify high-tech firms. 20  Appendix B presents my industry 
classification approach in detail. 
Table 1 summarizes my sample selection process. I start with all conference call transcripts 
between January 2006 and December 2018 available in the S&P Global Market Intelligence 
database. I restrict my sample to the conference calls identified as ‘earnings calls’ by the database, 
which are usually held shortly after firms’ earnings announcements. I then exclude the earnings 
conference calls held by non-US firms and those without Q&A sections. The resulting sample 
contains 120,180 earnings calls.  
I match the earnings calls with financial reporting and stock market related variables from 
Compustat and CRSP.21 After merging with Compustat and CRSP, there remain 115,982 earnings 
calls held by 5,200 firms. I further restrict my sample to the firms in the six industries whose KPIs 
are covered in my KPI list. Finally, I require non-missing values of variables used in my models. 
My sample has 39,302 firm-quarters of 1,846 unique firms during 2006-2018. Of the sample, the 
high-tech industry has the most observations (i.e., 24,555 firm-quarters for firms for 1,184 unique 
firms), while the airline industry is the smallest group (i.e., 714 firm-quarters for 25 unique firms).  
 
 
19 I refer to both 17 and 48 industry portfolios since the scope where the KPIs are applicable varies across 
different industries. For example, the KPIs of airline industry may not be applied to other industries covered 
by the transportation industry in Fama French 17 industry portfolios. 
20 Kile and Phillips (2009) examine the type I error and type II error of misclassification and demonstrate 
the optimal SIC codes combination to classify high-tech sector into hardware, software, medical technology, 
communications, electronic manufacturing, and Internet subgroups. I exclude the medical technology 
subgroup from my sample since this subgroup is likely to be related to pharmacy industry, which is not 
covered by my KPI list.  
21  Earnings calls are usually held within two days after the earnings announcements. Since earnings 
announcements are generally made at least several weeks after the end of the fiscal quarter, I match each 
earnings call with the closest fiscal quarter of the firm before the holding date of the call.  
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To further validate my selection of KPIs and industry classification, I check whether the 
KPIs are well-matched with their corresponding industries. For KPIs of a specific industry, I 
conduct key word searches across the earnings calls of all industries; and then, I compare the 
frequency of KPI mentions by the KPIs’ corresponding industry and that by other industries. 
Figure 3 Panel B displays the frequency of KPIs mentioned in managerial presentations of their 
corresponding industry and in those of other industries. For example, the airline industry’s KPIs 
are mentioned in 62% of managerial presentations during the earnings calls of airline firms, while 
they are mentioned in only 4% of the calls held by firms from other industries. Meanwhile, the 
KPIs of the high-tech industry are mentioned in 45% of high-tech firms’ managerial presentations 
and 22% of other industries’ calls suggesting that these KPIs may be less industry-specific. 
Similarly, Figure 3 Panel C presents the frequency of KPIs mentioned by analysts in the calls held 
by the corresponding industry and other industries.22 In summary, both graphs show that the KPIs 
selected in my term list are much more frequently mentioned in the earnings calls of their 
corresponding industries, suggesting a proper matching between my KPIs and the industries.23 
3.2.4 Measures of Managers’ Disclosure of KPI Information 
I measure the level of managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure using three different variables 
at the conference call level: (1) M_KPI, an indicator variable, which equals one if the management 
 
 
22 In Figure 3 Panel B, for high-tech and real estate industries’ KPIs, the analyst mentioning during their 
corresponding industries and other industries are relatively close. A potential reason is that following the 
I/B/E/S KPI database, my KPI term list includes “market share” (“backlog”) as an industry -specific KPI 
for high-tech (real estate) industry. Although the two KPIs are more frequently mentioned in their 
corresponding industry, they can also be used as common metrics for firms in all industries. Therefore, in 
untabulated tests, I reconduct my analysis for the high-tech (real estate) industry while excluding “market 
share” (“backlog”) from its industry-specific KPI list. 
23 I conduct z-tests (untabulated) to compare the likelihood of KPI mentions in the corresponding industry 
and that in other industries. The results are significant at 1% level, supporting my argument that KPIs are 
significantly more likely to be mentioned during the conference calls of their corresponding industries.  
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makes voluntary KPI disclosure during the presentation section of a given conference call, and 
zero otherwise; (2) M_KPI_Words, the logarithm of one plus the number of words covered by the 
sentences related to KPIs in the managerial presentation; and (3) M_KPI_Mentions, the logarithm 
of one plus the number of unique industry-specific KPIs mentioned in the managerial 
presentation.24 In summary, I use three measures to proxy the likelihood (M_KPI) and intensity 
(M_KPI_Words and M_KPI_Mentions) of managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure.  
3.2.5 Measures of Analysts’ Demand for KPI Disclosure 
Similarly, I measure analysts’ demand for KPI-related information at the conference call 
level. A_KPI is an indicator variable, which equals one if the analysts ask about any KPI of the 
firm’s industry during the Q&A section of the conference call, and zero otherwise.25 To capture 
the demand for KPI information expressed by analysts before a manager’s presentation, for each 
earnings call, I calculate the logarithm of one plus the sum of A_KPI for the firm’s calls held in 
the past eight quarters (A_KPI_PastQtrs). 
3.2.6 Regression Model for Testing Hypotheses 1-2 
The objective of this section is to examine whether firms improve their KPI disclosure 
following analyst demand expressed during earnings conference calls and whether there are cross-
 
 
24 I do not require the KPI disclosed by managers to be the same one that was requested by analysts. Since 
KPIs are closely related to firms’ operations, when analysts ask about a KPI, it may indicate information 
users’ interest in a specific aspect of the firm’s business. And managers’ efforts to better illustrate their 
operations may lead to the disclosure of other industry-specific KPIs. In robustness tests in Section 3.4.4, I 
reconduct my analyses focusing on the most frequently used KPI for each industry, including the “load 
factor” for airline industry, the “realized price” for energy industry, the “market share” for high -tech 
industry, the “production cost” for mining industry, the “backlog” for real estate industry, and the “same-
store sales” for retail industry, and find that the results are generally consistent.  
25 In supplemental analyses, I use the number of questions related to KPIs to measure analysts’ demand for 
(or interest in) KPI disclosure. 
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sectional variations in firms’ disclosure decisions. To test the association between analyst demand 
and future KPI disclosure, I model a manager’s voluntary KPI disclosure in the current quarter as 
a function of the demand from analysts in the past periods. The regression model is as follows:  
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴_𝐾𝑃𝐼_𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑖(𝑡−8,…,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 𝑀_𝐾𝑃𝐼_𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑠_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 
                                    +𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟_𝐾𝑃𝐼_𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑠_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑀_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 
                        +𝛽5𝐴_𝐴𝑙𝑙_𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   
                             +𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 
                                      +𝛽14 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  
                                      +𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀                                                  (Eq. 1) 
In this regression, the subscript i denotes firm and the subscript t denotes fiscal quarter of 
the firm-quarter observation. The dependent variable for managerial voluntary KPI disclosure is 
proxied by 𝑀_𝐾𝑃𝐼, M_KPI_Words, or M_KPI_Mentions. The model is a probit regression when 
the dependent variable is 𝑀_𝐾𝑃𝐼, otherwise it is an OLS regression. The variable of interest 
𝐴_𝐾𝑃𝐼_𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑠 measures the analysts’ total demand for KPIs from quarter t-8 to quarter t-1.26 I 
correct for outliers by winsorizing the continuous variables at 1 and 99 percentiles. To support H1, 
I expect a positive coefficient on A_KPI_PastQtrs. 
To address inter-industry differences, this model controls for industry fixed effects and 
clusters the standard error at the firm level. To control for potential time trends in the prevalence 
of KPI disclosure, I include quarter fixed effects. Considering the potential impact of the firm’s 
past KPI disclosure patterns, I include indicator variables about whether the manager disclosed 
 
 
26 In the supplemental analysis in Section 3.4.3, I replace A_KPI_PastQtrs with analyst demand variables 
for individual quarters and reconduct my analysis. (The results are similar to those using A_KPI_PastQtrs.) 
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about KPI-related information in their presentations (M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy) or the Q&A 
sections (Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy) during the past eight quarters. I further control for the 
total number of words in the prepared presentation of the earnings call (M_PresentationWords) to 
capture the total information volume delivered in the managerial presentation. I also add the 
average number of questions raised by analysts in the past eight quarters 
(A_All_Questions_PastQtrs) as a proxy for the overall disclosure demand from analysts before the 
current earnings call.  
I also include other factors documented to be associated with the use of alternative 
measures. Cohen et al. (2012) find that larger firms provide more voluntary disclosure about 
nonfinancial leading indicators (e.g., customer satisfaction).27  As KPIs cover industry-specific 
operational measures and their proprietary nature may alter the association between firm size and 
managers’ disclosure decisions, I control for firm size (Size) but do not make a prediction about 
its association with managerial KPI disclosure. Following Givoly et al. (2019), I also include an 
indicator to control for loss firms (Loss) and the firm’s absolute accruals (Accruals). 
In addition, I include factors from the general voluntary disclosure (e.g., Lang and 
Lundholm 1993; Frankel et al. 1999; Kim and Shi, 2012). I control for firm profitability (ROA), 
measured as the net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets; earnings surprise 
(SUE), measured as the difference between the firm’s actual earnings per share and the expectation 
of financial analysts, scaled by stock price; stock return volatility (RetVol), measured as the 
standard deviation of the firm’s monthly stock returns over the past two years; leverage (Leverage), 
 
 
27 While Cohen et al. (2012) do not distinguish nonfinancial measures by industry, they find that firms’ 
disclosure of nonfinancial leading indicators varies across industries. This is consistent with my argument 
that KPIs are industry-specific.  
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measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; growth opportunities (MB), measured as the 
ratio of the firm’s market value of total equity to the book value of total equity; institut ional 
ownership (IO), measured as the percentage ownership of institutional investors; and analyst 
coverage (FollowingAnalysts), measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
analysts following the firm. 
To examine the cross-sectional variation in the effects of analyst demand, I respectively 
add the following variables and their interactions with analyst demand to Equation (1): proxies for 
low earnings relevance (LowRelev, Loss, and Accruals), a measure of proprietary costs (Fluidity), 
and an indicator of the KPI information demanders’ connectivity to the management 
(A_Access_PastQtrs).28   
My H2a examines whether a firm’s earnings relevance affects its KPI disclosure decisions 
following analyst demand. Following Banker et al. (2009), I measure firm-specific earnings 
relevance using the explanatory power from a regression of a firm’s stock price on earnings per 
share and equity book value per share.29 To ensure that accounting information has been released 
and disseminated, I measure the stock price three months after the fiscal-quarter ends. Using 
adjusted R-squared of the regression as my measure of earnings relevance, I identify an indicator 
variable (LowRelev) which equals one for firms with earnings relevance below the median by 
industry-quarter. To support my H2a, I expect a positive coefficient on the interaction term 
 
 
28 Fluidity measure how much the firm’s competitors modify their product portfolios in response to the 
firm’s disclosure which reflects the firm’s concerns about its proprietary information leakage.  
29 In their firm-year-specific estimation for value relevance, Banker et al. (2009) uses a ten-year rolling 
window and requires data available for each firm in at least eight years since 1980. Similar to their approach, 
I require available data for at least eight firm-quarter observations in the ten-quarter rolling window in my 
estimation for earnings relevance. In untabulated analyses, I estimate the regression for each subindustry-
quarter to calculate the value of earnings relevance for each two-digit SIC code in each quarter. (The results 
are similar to those reported in Table 6.) 
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between LowRelev and A_KPI_PastQtrs, indicating that when a firm’s earnings are less useful, 
managers increase the likelihood and intensity of their KPI disclosure after receiving the demand 
from financial analysts.  
Moreover, due to the potential noise of the firm-level measure of earnings relevance, I 
employ two other proxies to identify firms with lower earnings relevance. Prior studies find that 
earnings numbers tend to be less useful when the firm reports a loss or a large discrepancy between 
earnings and operating cash flows (e.g., Lev and Gu, 2016; Givoly et al., 2019). I thus use an 
indicator variable to capture whether the firm reports a loss in the current period (Loss) and the 
absolute value of total accruals scaled by absolute net operating cash flow (Accruals) to identify 
potentially lower earnings relevance.  
To measure firm-level proprietary costs, I use the measure of product market fluidity 
(Fluidity) calculated by Hoberg et al. (2014). Fluidity measures the competitive threat faced by a 
firm and reflects how the firm’s competitors modify their product portfolios in response to the 
firm’s disclosure. Some studies have demonstrated the association between competition and 
proprietary costs (e.g., Ali et al., 2014; Bernard, 2016; Huang et al., 2017), but most competition 
measures focus on industry-level variation (e.g., Karuna, 2007; Li, 2010), such as the proxies of 
the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and the four-firm concentration ratio. Following Imhof et al. 
(2018) and Dedman and Lennox (2009), I use the measure of product competition to proxy for the 
firm’s proprietary costs of disclosure. Calculated using textual analysis technology, Fluidity 
captures the similarity between a firm’s word usage in its product description in 10-K filings and 
the average change of the word usage by its competitors. A higher Fluidity value indicates that the 
firm’s competition space in the product market reduces due to the moves made by its competitors, 
and thus, higher proprietary costs faced by the firm. To support my H2b, I predict the coefficients 
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for the interaction term between Fluidity and A_KPI_PastQtrs to be negative, suggesting that 
higher proprietary cost discourages the increase of managerial KPI disclosure. 
My H2c examines whether the connectivity between analysts and firm management affects 
the effect of analyst KPI demand. Following prior literature, I use analysts’ early participation in 
conference calls as a proxy for their special access to management, since managers usually invite 
well-connected analysts to ask the first questions, and those invitations are highly valued by 
analysts and their employers (e.g., Mayew, 2008; Cen et al., 2020). For each earnings call, I first 
identify the connected analysts based on whether the analyst was invited to ask the first question 
during any earnings call held by the firm in the past four quarters. I then generate an indicator 
variable for the current quarter, A_Access, which equals one if any KPI-related question is posed 
by the connected analysts, and zero otherwise. To capture the impact of connectivity on future 
managerial disclosure, I further construct an indicator variable (A_Access_PastQtrs) which equals 
one if connected analysts requested KPIs in any of the past eight quarters, and zero otherwise. 
Consistent with other cross-sectional tests, I add this variable and its interaction term with 
A_KPI_PastQtrs to Equation (1). To support my H2c, I predict the coefficients for the interaction 
term to be significantly positive. 
3.2.7 Conclusion 
Section 3.2 reviews the construction of my KPI term list, the sample selection methods, 
the measures of managerial KPI disclosure and analysts’ demand for KPI -related information, and 
the design of my regression models. Equation (1) is used to test hypothesis H1, and the results will 
be reported in Section 3.3.4. I add interaction terms to Equation (1) to test hypotheses H2a, H2b, 
and H2c, and will report the results in Section 3.3.5.  
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3.3 Empirical Analysis  
3.3.1 Introduction 
 In Section 3.3, I test the hypotheses on the effect of analyst demand on managerial 
voluntary KPI disclosure and the cross-sectional variation in this effect. Section 3.3.2 presents the 
descriptive statistics relevant to my Equations (1). Section 3.3.3 describes my initial exploration 
of the determinants of analysts’ interest in industry-specific KPIs. Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 report 
the results of the hypotheses separately. I conclude the empirical analysis in Section 3.3.6. 
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Testing Hypotheses 1-2 
Table 2 presents the sample distribution of my KPI key word search results by industry and 
earnings call holding year. While the industry-specific KPIs are voluntarily disclosed by managers 
in about half of the earnings calls, the frequency of analysts’ questions about KPIs varies across 
industries. Analysts ask about KPIs in about 56.1% (12.4%) of the conference calls held by firms 
in airline industry (energy industry). There are several potential reasons for this variation. First, 
the industry-specific KPIs themselves may have various degrees of usefulness for different 
industries. As a result, managers and analysts may discuss KPIs to different extents during the 
earnings calls. Furthermore, the coverage of my KPI list may vary across industries. In other words, 
the KPI list may include almost all KPIs for one industry while missing some important KPIs for 
another industry. 
Table 3 provides the summary statistics.30 On average, managers voluntarily disclose KPIs 
during their presentations in about half of the earnings calls (i.e., the mean of M_KPI), while 
 
 
30 In all the tables, the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
47 
 
analysts ask about KPI-related information in the Q&A sections in 23.3% of calls (i.e., the mean 
of A_KPI). In addition, 62.2% of observations show that analysts demanded KPI information in 
the past two years, suggesting the analysts’ high interest in KPI-related information (i.e., the mean 
of A_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy). In terms of the control variables, the average leverage ratio is 0.50; 
and, on average, each firm in my sample is covered by 9.7 financial analysts. 
3.3.3 Determinants of Analysts’ Demand for KPI Disclosure 
While my hypotheses H1, H2a, H2b, and H2c focus on the association between analysts’ 
demand and managers’ voluntary disclosure of KPIs, little is known about  analysts’ decisions to 
pose their requests for KPI-related information during conference calls. Therefore, before testing 
the hypotheses, I conduct some descriptive analysis to explore the potential determinants of 
analysts’ requests for KPI-related information. I model analysts’ requests for KPI disclosure 
(A_KPI) as a function of the factors that may trigger their interest in KPIs. I include variables 
related to the communication between firm management and the analysts, including the manager’s 
mentioning of industry-specific KPIs in the presentation section (M_KPI), the total number of 
words delivered in a managerial presentation (M_PresentationWords), the manager’s mentioning 
of KPIs in past earnings call presentations (M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy) and Q&A sections 
(Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy), the number of questions asked by analysts in the Q&A section 
(A_All_Questions), and the analysts’ persistent interest in KPIs in past periods 
(A_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy).  
I then consider how firm characteristics are related to information users’ needs for KPI 
disclosure. I control for variables such as firm size (Size), profitability (ROA), and analyst 
following (FollowingAnalysts). Moreover, Givoly et al. (2019) find that analysts tend to provide 
KPI forecasts when firms report losses or high absolute accruals. I thus add an indicator of loss 
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firms (Loss), the absolute accrual variable (Accruals), and other variables affecting corporate KPI 
disclosure as demonstrated in my cross-sectional tests (LowRelev and Fluidity). 
Table 4 presents the results of the potential determinants of analyst KPI demand. Column 
1 shows that analysts express more interest in KPI information when the manager talks about KPIs 
at the beginning of the earnings call, when the analysts get more opportunities to pose questions, 
and when there was more KPI disclosure in the past eight quarters. And the significantly positive 
coefficient of A_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy indicates the persistence of analysts’ interest. 31  The 
coefficient of Fluidity is positive and significant, suggesting that analysts are interested in the 
operational performance of firms with value-relevant proprietary information.  
Due to the potential difference between analysts with access to management and other 
financial analysts, I replace the dependent variable with an indicator capturing whether KPI-related 
questions are raised by analysts with connectivity to the management (A_Access). Column 2 shows 
that most results are similar to those in Column 1. Moreover, the coefficient on FollowingAnalysts 
is negative and significant, consistent with the connected analysts being less willing to share KPI-
related information with others when the number of analysts following the firm is high.    
3.3.4 Results for Hypothesis H1 
Table 5 presents the results of my empirical analysis for H1. In Column 1, I examine 
whether analysts’ demand for KPI information in the past eight quarters is associated w ith an 
increase in managers’ likelihood of voluntary KPI disclosure during the current quarter’s 
conference calls. The coefficient on analysts’ past demand (A_KPI_PastQtrs) is 0.294 and is 
 
 
31 The persistence of analysts’ interest in KPIs supports my choice to integrate analysts’ KPI demand in the 
past eight quarters to capture their requests for KPI disclosure in my main analysis.  
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significant at the 1% level, supporting my prediction that managers are more likely to disclose 
about KPIs following analysts’ requests. The improvement is economically significant, 
representing a 29.4% increase of managerial KPI disclosure probability. In Column 2, I regress 
the number of words covered by sentences about industry-specific KPIs in managers’ presentations 
on past analyst KPI demand. I find that after analysts ask for KPI information, the managers 
increase the KPI-related content in their presentations. Similarly, Column 3 suggests that past 
analyst demand is positively associated with the number of industry-specific KPIs mentioned by 
managers.  
The signs of control variables are largely consistent with expectations. The coefficients on 
M_PresentationWords across the three columns are significantly positive, consistent with the 
perception that managers have a higher capacity to include KPI-related contents when they provide 
longer presentations. The coefficients on M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy and 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy are significantly positive, suggesting that managers’ KPI 
disclosure is highly persistent. Further, A_All_Questions_PastQtrs has negative coefficients, 
consistent with managers paying less attention to KPI-related questions when analysts ask many 
other unrelated questions. Firms with higher profitability make more voluntary KPI disclosure. 
While prior literature finds that larger firms tend to make more and better corporate disclosure 
(e.g., Lev and Penman, 1990; Frankel et al., 1997), my analysis shows a significantly negative 
coefficient for firm size, suggesting that KPI disclosure is more prevalent among small firms who 
provide relatively less other disclosure. 
In summary, the analyses support my H1 that managers increase their KPI disclosure in 




3.3.5 Results for Hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c 
In this section, I examine under which conditions the increase of managerial KPI disclosure 
is more pronounced. Since managers make their voluntary disclosure based on the potential costs 
and benefits, I identify two important considerations in managerial decision making: the benefits 
of providing value-relevant performance measures to supplement the less useful earnings 
information; and the proprietary costs related to the revealing of private operational information.  
Table 6 presents the results of my empirical analysis for H2a. Column 1, 2, and 3 use 
LowRelev as an indicator variable identifying the firms whose earnings numbers are less relevant. 
In Column 1, the interaction term of LowRelev and A_KPI_PastQtrs has a significantly positive 
coefficient, suggesting that firms with lower earnings relevance are more likely to provide KPI 
disclosure in the post periods of analysts’ demand. In Column 2, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is positive, yet not significant. In Column 3, the coefficient of the interaction term is 
significantly positive, consistent with managers increasing the number of KPIs to present at the 
beginning of conference calls. Column 4, 5, and 6 report H2a results using Loss as an indicator of 
low earnings relevance. Column 4 and 5 show a significantly more pronounced effect of analyst 
demand on loss firms. However, the coefficient of interaction in Column 6 is negative and not 
significant. The insignificance could be explained by the loss firms trying to avoid mentioning 
some KPIs that report bad performance. In Column 7, 8, and 9, I use absolute accruals (Accruals) 
as a proxy for the irrelevance of firms’ reported earnings. The significantly positive coefficients 
for the interaction terms are consistent with my H2a prediction. Taken together, my analyses 
largely support the argument that when firms cannot provide useful earnings numbers, managers 
tend to increase their KPI disclosure to a greater extent. 
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 Table 7 shows the results of my H2b. Higher Fluidity represents higher competition faced 
by the firm in the product market and thus higher proprietary costs related to the firm’s KPI 
information release. In Column 1, the interaction term of Fluidity and A_KPI_PastQtrs has 
significantly negative coefficient, suggesting that firms with more concerns about their proprietary 
information are less likely to provide KPI disclosure following analysts’ demand. In Column 2 and 
3, the coefficients of the interaction term are also significantly negative, consistent with managers 
reducing the intensity of their KPI disclosure when they are more concerned about their proprietary 
information leakage. Collectively, the results support my conjecture that firms faced with higher 
proprietary costs are unwilling to improve KPI disclosure even when analysts ask for that 
information. 
I then examine whether the connectivity between analysts and the management affects the 
effect of analyst KPI demand. In Table 8, I add A_Access_PastQtrs and its interaction with 
A_KPI_PastQtrs to Equation (1). A_Access_PastQtrs indicates the KPI demand from connected 
analysts during the past eight quarters. In Column 1, the estimated coefficient on the interaction 
term is positive and significant, suggesting that managers are more likely to provide KPI disclosure 
when the demand is posted by connected analysts. In Column 2 and 3, the marginal effects of the 
interactions are also significantly positive, consistent with my hypotheses that managers increase 
the length of their KPI-related disclosure and the number of KPIs covered to a higher extent when 
the demand comes from well-connected analysts. These findings imply that managers react more  
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strongly when the KPI-related questions are raised by analysts enjoying special access to the 
management.32 
3.3.6 Conclusion  
In summary, the evidence reported in Section 3.3 is generally consistent with my prediction 
that after analysts pose questions about KPI-related information, managers tend to increase both 
the likelihood and the intensity of their KPI disclosure in their presentations during future earnings 
calls. The effect of analyst demand is more pronounced when the firm’s earnings relevance is 
lower, when the firm faces less concerns about proprietary information leakage, and when the KPI 
demand is expressed by connected analysts. 
3.4 Additional analyses 
3.4.1 Introduction  
 In Section 3.4, I conduct additional tests to assess the robustness of my findings in Section 
3.3. I begin with efforts to mitigate the concern that the findings may not exist in all the six 
industries. Specifically, in Section 3.4.2, I conduct analyses to test hypothesis H1 for each 
individual industry; I then reconduct the analyses for the cross-sectional tests with the largest 
industry (i.e., high-tech industry) omitted. In Section 3.4.3, to mitigate the concerns on the 
persistency of KPI disclosure, I first examine the effect of analyst requests that happened in the 
past eight individual quarters and then investigate the effect on managers’ initial KPI disclosure  
 
 
32  In untabulated analyses, I replicate the analysis for H1 with A_KPI_PastQtrs replaced by 
A_Access_PastQtrs. The coefficients for A_Access_PastQtrs are significantly positive and higher than 
those for A_KPI_PastQtrs in Table 4. This is consistent with my prediction that managers have higher 




decisions. I construct new measures for KPI disclosure and analyst demand and reconduct my 
analyses in Section 3.4.4 and 3.4.5. Section 3.4.6 concludes this section with a summary.  
3.4.2 Subgroup Analyses  
One potential concern of my findings is that the results may be dominated by high-tech 
firms as the high-tech industry covers more than half of the observations. To mitigate this concern, 
I reconduct my analyses for each individual industry. Table 9 presents the effect of analyst demand 
on the probability of managerial KPI disclosure for each industry. I find that managers in all 
industries are more likely to make KPI disclosure following the requests from analysts. 
Additionally, the coefficient of A_KPI_PastQtrs is especially high for the airline industry 
subgroup. This is consistent with the prevalence of KPIs in the airline industry as shown in Figure 
3 Panel 2 and 3, suggesting that the KPIs selected in my list are very important performance 
measures for the airline industry. The untabulated analyses for the intensity of managerial KPI 
disclosure (M_KPI_Words, M_KPI_Mentions) has similar results.  
Table 10 reports the cross-sectional analyses with the high-tech industry omitted. The signs 
and significance levels of the coefficients on the interaction terms remain similar to those from the 
full sample analyses. Collectively, the results in Table 9 and 10 indicate that my results are not 
driven by the high-tech industry, and the effects exist across all six industries in my sample.  
3.4.3 The Persistency of KPI Disclosure 
 In Table 11, I reconduct the Equation (1) analysis with A_KPI_PastQtrs replaced by the 
analyst demand variables (A_KPI) for individual quarters, from t-1 to t-8, respectively. While the 
effect of analysts’ KPI demand remains significant, with the increasing interval between requests 
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and disclosure, it appears that near-term KPI demand has a distinct impact.33 To further investigate 
this possibility, I separate out analysts’ initial KPI demand from those that are more “stale.” 
 Specifically, to mitigate concerns that my main findings are driven by the persistency of 
managerial disclosure, I examine the effect of analysts’ KPI demand in quarter t -1 for two 
subgroups. My first test focuses on the firm-quarters with no KPI disclosure in managerial 
presentation in quarter t-1 and examines whether analysts’ demand in the last quarter is associated 
with managers’ initiation of KPI disclosure in the current quarter. Table 12, Column 1, 2, and 3 
present the results of this test. In Column 1, the significantly positive coefficient on A_KPI in 
quarter t-1 suggests that managers tend to initiate KPI disclosure when they receive KPI demand 
from analysts in the last quarter. Moreover, the results reported in Column 2 and 3 suggest that for 
firms without any KPI disclosure in the last quarter’s earnings calls, analyst demand is associated 
with higher intensity of KPI disclosure in the current quarter. 
 Another alternative explanation of my findings is that the requests from analysts are 
persistent and managers only react to the needs of information users when they see cumulative 
demand, which undermines the effectiveness of the supply-demand mechanism of KPI disclosure. 
Therefore, I further investigate whether the initiation of analyst demand is associated with the 
initiation of managerial KPI disclosure. In Column 4 to 6 of Table 12, I focus on the firm-quarters 
with no KPI disclosure in managerial presentation in quarter t-1 and no questions from analysts 
 
 
33 Since using nonstationary variables in regressions may lead to spurious results (Granger and Newbold, 
1974), I examine whether the variables in my sample are stationary. The untabulated results reject the null 
hypothesis that none of the panels is stationary. In case some panels are nonstationary, I further test for the 
cointegration of the panel data, since the issue of spurious results would not exist when the non-stationary 
variables are cointegrated (Phillips, 1986). My untabulated results significantly reject the null of no 




about KPIs in quarter t-2. The results in Column 4 indicate that when analysts initiate a request for 
KPI-related information in quarter t-1, managers are more likely to start to disclose about KPIs in 
the current quarter. The results in Column 5 and 6 also support a significant effect of initial analyst 
demand. Collectively, the findings in Table 12 suggest that my analysis is not dominated by the 
persistency of KPI disclosure/demand.  
3.4.4 Alternative Selection of KPIs  
My KPI list contains 51 KPI measures for six industries. A potential concern is that the 
number of KPIs and the coverage of the KPI list may vary across industries. In an attempt to 
address this issue, I select one KPI that is mentioned the most by managers and analysts in each 
industry and get a new list of six KPIs, including the “load factor” for the airline industry, the 
“realized price” for the energy industry, the “market share” for the high-tech industry, the 
“production cost” for the mining industry, the “backlog” for the real estate industry, and the “same 
store sales” for the retail industry. Using this new KPI list, I reconstruct my main variables about 
the mentioning of KPIs, such as M_KPI, A_KPI, and A_KPI_PastQtrs. In Table 13 I reconduct 
my main analysis using the new measures generated. The results suggest that the variation of KPI 
coverage across industries is not a severe problem in my study.  
3.4.5 Alternative Measure of Analysts’ Demand for KPI Disclosure 
 In my main analysis, I use an indicator variable (A_KPI) to measure whether analysts ask 
about KPIs during an earnings conference call. Analysts’ demand for KPI disclosure can also be 
measured using the number of questions asked about KPIs. I test my main hypotheses using the 
number of KPI-related questions. In Table 14, the variable of interest is the logarithm of one plus 
the total number of KPI-related questions asked during the past eight quarters 
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(A_KPI_Questions_PastQtrs). In Column 1, the coefficients on A_KPI_Questions_PastQtrs 
remain significantly positive, supporting my argument that analysts’ demand for KPI -related 
information during Q&A sections motivates managers to provide voluntary KPI disclosure in their 
presentations. In Columns 2 to 4, the coefficients on the interaction terms are consistent with my 
cross-sectional hypotheses. I also explore the determinants of analysts’ interest in KPIs using the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of KPI-related questions (A_KPI_Questions) and the 
untabulated results are consistent with those reported in Table 4.  
3.4.6 Conclusion 
 In summary, Section 3.4 demonstrates that my primary findings are robust to the subgroup 
analyses for individual industries; that the analysts’ demand for KPI information has relatively 
long-term effects but the impact declines over time; and that my results are not dominated by the 
persistence of KPI disclosure/demand. The evidence reported in this section also strengthens my 
findings in Section 3.3 by using alternative measures for managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure and 




The Effect of KPI Disclosure in Conference Calls on Analyst Earnings 
Forecast Accuracy 
4.1 Hypotheses Development (Hypotheses H3-H4) 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 The findings in Chapter 3 suggest a well-functioning demand-supply mechanism of KPI 
disclosure. In this chapter, I explore the consequences of KPI disclosure, namely, whether financial 
analysts use KPI-related information to improve the quality of their work. In Section 4.1.2, I 
discuss the association between managers’ voluntary disclosure about industry-specific KPIs and 
the accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. I posit hypothesis H3 for this research 
question. Section 4.1.3 presents my hypothesis H4 to test whether the demand from financial 
analysts plays a role in the effect of KPI disclosure. Section 4.1.4 concludes this section with a 
summary. 
4.1.2 KPI Disclosure and the Accuracy of Analyst Earnings Forecasts 
 As reviewed in Chapter 2, prior literature has shown the importance of industry-specific 
information among financial analysts’ knowledge about the firms they follow. For example, 
Brown et al. (2015) survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 interviews to investigate the inputs and 
incentives of financial analysts. They find that industry-level knowledge is the single most 
valuable type of information for analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. Brown 
et al. (2016) conduct surveys and interviews for buy-side analysts and conclude that, from the 
perspective of buy-side analysts, the most valuable functions of sell-side analysts are to provide 
industry knowledge and access to firm management. The importance of industry-specific 
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knowledge suggests the necessity to further test what information is acquired by analysts and how 
they collect the information.  
 Moreover, prior studies have documented that some industry-specific KPIs are leading 
indicators for future performance which may be especially important for financial analysts in the 
task of making forecasts. Rajgopal et al. (2003) investigate the relevance of an industrial 
nonfinancial measure (specifically, the order backlog in durable manufacturing and computers 
industry) to future earnings. They find that after controlling for past earnings, the order backlog is 
still informative about future earnings. Behn and Riley (1999) find that in the airline industry, 
nonfinancial metrics, such as available ton-miles and ticket over-sales, are leading indicators of 
financial performance. Simpson (2010) focuses on nonfinancial KPIs in the wireless industry (e.g., 
customer acquisition cost, number of subscribers, etc.) and finds that the KPIs predict the firms’ 
future financial performance, but that analysts underreact to the release of KPI information. 
Collectively, the KPI literature has highlighted the usefulness of KPIs as performance indicators 
and value drivers.  
 Therefore, I expect that managers’ disclosure of industry-specific KPIs would add 
especially valuable information to financial analysts’ knowledge about the firm and would enable 
analysts to make better predictions about the firm’s future performance. Despite the importance of 
industry-specific KPIs, prior analyst literature has been focused on the impact of general voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Aerts et al., 2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2012) or the 
knowledge of analysts related to their work and study experience (e.g., Clement, 1999; Rubin et 
al., 2017). An exception is Givoly et al. (2019), who examine analysts’ forecasts of KPIs. Using 
the I/B/E/S KPI database, the authors investigate analysts’ forecast of 28 KPIs for firms in four 
industries (i.e., the airline, pharmaceutical, retail, and oil and gas industries). The authors 
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demonstrate that the KPI forecasts made by analysts are more accurate than their earnings forecasts, 
consistent with analysts possessing superior industry-level knowledge (Brown et al., 2015). My 
study extends Givoly et al. (2019) by investigating the spillover effect of KPI-related information 
to analysts’ earnings forecasts which is generally believed one of the most important outputs of 
financial analysts (e.g., Fried and Givoly, 1982; Bradshaw et al., 2017). I state my hypothesis as 
follow: 
H3: Following managers’ voluntary disclosure of KPI-related information during conference 
calls, there is an increase in the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
 This hypothesis is not without tension. As documented in the literature, the rise of KPIs 
paralleled the deterioration of earnings relevance (e.g., Lev and Gu, 2016). Despite the usefulness 
of KPI-related information, one of the most important inputs for f inancial analysts is earnings 
numbers (Das et al., 1998). Therefore, analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy may not improve or 
may even decrease when the increase of KPI disclosure accompanies declining usefulness of 
earnings numbers or other corporate disclosure. Moreover, prior literature about non-GAAP 
earnings suggests that while adjusted earnings are informative (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; 
Brown and Sivakumar, 2003), they may also be used opportunistically to mislead investors (e.g., 
Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Frankel et al., 2011). I argue that, compared with non-GAAP earnings, 
the disclosure of KPIs allows even more space for opportunistic reporting. Since KPIs are not 
audited, and there is no unified list of KPIs for each industry, managers have the discretion to 
decide which KPI to disclose as well as the calculation method used to generate the KPI. Therefore, 
although some KPIs can serve as leading indicators for future financial performance (e.g., 
Rajgopal et al., 2003; Simpson, 2010), the quality of KPI disclosure can be highly variable; thus, 
managers may select and use KPIs to provide misleading information. Furthermore, a recent study 
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by Basu and Xiang (2020) has questioned the value of conference calls from analysts’ perspectives. 
The authors find that the financial analysts’ earnings forecasts do not become more accurate around 
earnings conference calls. They argue that analysts may ignore the information in conference calls 
when they have private access to the management. Overall, the disclosure of KPIs during 
conference calls may not improve and may even decrease analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy.   
4.1.3 The Role of Analysts in KPI Disclosure and the Accuracy of Analyst Earnings Forecasts 
 I further examine whether the increase of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy (if any) is 
especially salient when the KPI-related disclosure is motivated by the requests from financial 
analysts. I expect the H3 effect would be more pronounced under this condition for two reasons. 
First, analysts’ questions about industry-specific KPIs reflect the usefulness of KPIs for their 
evaluation, prediction, and recommendation about the firm. Gibbons et al. (2020) investigate 
financial analysts’ information acquisition via EDGAR and find that analysts collect more 
information for large and complex firms, consistent with the information about these firms being 
especially useful for financial analysts. Additionally, analysts’ interest in KPIs may indicate their 
efforts and ability to use the KPI-related information disclosed by managers. Cen et al. (2020) 
investigate analysts’ interest in supply-chain-related information and argue that interest can lead 
to increased attention to a specific area (e.g., Ainley et al., 2002) and superior inference about the 
information (Estes and Vaughan, 1973). Therefore, I predict that when analysts are more interested 
in KPI-related information, they tend to interpret the information more comprehensively and 
improve their forecasts about the firm to a greater extent. I state my last hypothesis as follows: 
H4: The association between managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure and the accuracy of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (if any) is more salient when the KPI disclosure is motivated by 




 In Section 4.1, I posit two hypotheses to be tested in empirical analyses. I present my 
hypothesis H3 in support of a positive association between managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure in 
earnings calls and the accuracy of analysts’ future earnings forecasts. I present hypothesis H4 to 
test whether this association is more evident when the KPI-related information is disclosed 
following analysts’ demand . 
4.2 Research Design 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 Section 4.2 describes aspects related to my data and research design for the hypotheses 
developed in the previous section. The section begins by introducing my measure of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts accuracy in Section 4.2.2. I then present the regressions models to test 
hypotheses H3 and H4 in Section 4.2.3. Considering the potential endogeneity between managers’ 
disclosure decisions and the usefulness of the KPI-related information released, I employ Heckman 
(1979)’s two-step approach with a choice model using Equation (1) in Section 3.2.6. I conclude 
with a summary in Section 4.2.4. 
4.2.2 The Measure of Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Accuracy 
 I measure the accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts for each firm-quarter. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Cheng et al., 2016), I define the error of analysts’ forecast as the 
negative value of the absolute difference between actual earnings per share and the consensus of 
earnings per share forecast, scaled by the actual stock price. The forecast consensus is the average 
value of financial analysts’ estimation for the quarterly earnings per share reported in the quarter 
before the publication of the quarterly report. Due to the small magnitude of the forecast error, my 
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measure of forecast accuracy (Accuracy) equals the forecast error variable multiplied by -100. 
Higher values for Accuracy represent higher accuracy (i.e. lower error) of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. 
4.2.3 Regression model for Testing Hypotheses 3-4 
The objective of this section is to examine whether there is an increase in analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy after managers make voluntary disclosure of KPIs during their presentations in 
conference calls; and further, whether the increase of analyst forecast accuracy, if any, is more 
evident when financial analysts expressed their demand for KPI-related information in past 
earnings calls.  
The disclosure of industry-specific KPIs is a discretionary decision made by firm 
management. Since managers consider both the benefits and costs of KPI disclosure, there is a 
potential endogeneity issue between managers’ disclosure decisions and the usefulness of the KPI -
related information released. To address the potential self-selection problem, I follow Simpson 
(2010) and employ the Heckman (1979) two-step approach. Specifically, I use Equation (1) in 
Section 3.2.6 as a choice model of voluntary KPI disclosure, in which managers’ voluntary KPI 
disclosure is regressed on analysts’ demand for KPI-related information and a set of firm 
characteristics that may influence voluntary disclosure decisions.34  In this probit regression, the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable, M_KPI, which equals one if the management makes 
 
 
34 Simpson (2010) uses the financial analysts’ forecast error to capture the information usefulness o r the 
potential benefits of managers’ disclosure decisions. My study captures the usefulness of KPI -related 
information for financial analysts using a more direct measure, which is the information demand expressed 
by analysts during the Q&A sections in previous earnings calls (A_KPI_PastQtrs). 
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voluntary KPI disclosure during the presentation section of a given conference call, and zero 
otherwise. 
As introduced in Section 3.2.6, I control for the firm’s past disclosure patterns, including 
the firm’s past disclosure of KPIs in previous presentations (M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy) and the 
Q&A sections (Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy). I control for characteristics of the firm’s 
conference calls, including the length of the prepared presentation (M_PresentationWords) and 
the average number of questions raised by analysts in the past eight quarters 
(A_All_Questions_PastQtrs). I also include a set of firm characteristics related to the use of 
alternative performance measures: firm size (Size), total accruals (Accruals), firm profitability 
(ROA), growth opportunity (MB), earnings surprise (SUE), stock return volatility (RetVol), 
leverage level (Leverage), institutional ownership (IO), analyst coverage (FollowingAnalysts), and 
an indicator of loss firms (Loss). The detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix D.  
To address inter-industry differences, this model controls for industry fixed effects and 
clusters the standard error at the firm level. To control for potential time trends in the prevalence 
of KPI disclosure, I include quarter fixed effects. Based on the coefficients estimated in this 
regression, I calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) and include it as an additional explanatory 
variable in the second equation. 
In the second equation, to test the association between KPI disclosure and analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy, I model the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts for the firm’s earnings in 
the next quarter as a function of the manager’s voluntary KPI disclosure in this quarter’s earnings 
call. The system of equations using Heckman (1979) two-step approach is as follows: 
𝑀_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴_𝐾𝑃𝐼_𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑖(𝑡−8,…,𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 𝑀_𝐾𝑃𝐼_𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑠_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 
                         +𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟_𝐾𝑃𝐼_𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑠_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4  𝑀_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡 
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            +𝛽5𝐴_𝐴𝑙𝑙_𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   
                 +𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 
                                   +𝛽14 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 
                                   +𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀                                                    (Eq. 1) 
 
     𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀_𝐾𝑃𝐼_𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑟𝑠_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡                              
                                 +𝛽4𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡  
      +𝛽9 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑆𝑈𝐸 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 
                                  +𝛽13 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 
                                   +𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀                                                           (Eq. 2) 
In this regression, the subscript i denotes the firm, and the subscript t denotes the fiscal 
quarter of the firm-quarter observation. The dependent variable Accuracy measures the accuracy 
of financial analysts’ estimation about quarterly earnings per share. The variable of interest, 
M_KPI, is an indicator variable which equals one if the manager provides any voluntary KPI 
disclosure in quarterly earnings call, and zero otherwise. In addition to some firm characteristics 
controlled in Equation (1), Equation (2) controls for the financial analysts’ forecast accuracy for 
this quarter (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) and three variables documented to be related to analysts’ forecast 
accuracy (e.g., Simpson, 2010; Abarbanell, 1991; and Frankel and Lee, 1998): the firm’s past stock 
return (PastRet), which is the stock return from two month before to one month after the quarter 
end; the book value per share scaled by stock price (BVPS), and the sales growth (SalesGrowth). 
IMR is the Inverse Mills Ratio calculated based on the coefficients estimated in Equation (1). I 
control for quarter fixed effects and industry fixed effects in this model. To support H3, I expect a 
positive coefficient on M_KPI.  
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To examine whether the association between voluntary KPI disclosure and analyst forecast 
accuracy is more pronounced for KPI disclosure motivated by analyst demand, I add an indicator 
variable (M_KPI_Motivated) which equals one only if managers provide KPI disclosure after 
analysts request the information in the past quarter, and zero otherwise. Specifically, 
𝑀_𝐾𝑃𝐼_𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 × 𝐴_𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 , where A_KPI is an indicator variable, which 
equals one if the analysts ask about any KPI of the firm’s industry during the Q&A section of the 
conference call, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, to examine whether the H3 effect is more 
significant when KPI-related disclosure was requested by financial analysts, I control for 𝑀_𝐾𝑃𝐼in 
the second equation. To support H4, I expect the coefficient of M_KPI_Motivated to be 
significantly positive after controlling for M_KPI.35  
4.2.4 Conclusion 
Section 4.2 describes my measure of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and the use of 
Heckman (1979) two-step approach to address the potential self-section issue in my empirical 
analyses. I use Equation (1) as a choice model to capture managers’ discretionary decisions about 
KPI disclosure. I then include the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) calculated from the choice model in 
Equation (2) to test hypotheses H3 and H4. The empirical results are reported in Section 4.3.  
4.3 Empirical Results 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 In this section, I test the hypotheses on the effect of managerial voluntary KPI disclosure 
on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. Section 4.3.2 presents the sample selection and descriptive 
 
 
35  I expect the coefficient on M_KPI to be less significant or become insignificant after including 
M_KPI_Motivated in the model.  
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statistics relevant to my Heckman (1979) two-step equation system. Section 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 reports 
the results of hypotheses H3 and H4, respectively. Section 4.3.5 presents the results of my 
subgroup analyses and follows with a summary of my empirical results in Section 4.3.6. 
4.3.2 Sample Selection & Summary Statistics 
 Similar to the sample selection process in Section 3.3.2, I start with all quarterly earnings 
conference call transcripts between January 2006 and December 2018 available in the S&P Global 
Market Intelligence database. After restricting to the US firms with Q&A sections, I match the 
sample with Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S databases. Finally, I require non-missing values of 
variables used in my regression models and get a final sample of 31,502 firm-quarters for 1,720 
unique firms. 
 Table 15 presents the summary statistics for the sample. Similar to the findings in Section 
3.3.2, managers voluntarily disclose KPIs during their presentations in more than half of the 
earnings calls (52.4%). In about 16% of conference calls, financial analysts requested KPI-related 
information in the past quarter, and managers conduct voluntary KPI disclosure in the current 
quarter. Further, the average value of Accuracy is -0.981 which is comparable with the value 
observed in prior literature.36 In terms of the control variables, the average leverage ratio is 0.508; 
and, on average, each firm in my sample is covered by 6.83 financial analysts. 
4.3.3 Results for Hypothesis H3 
 
 
36 For example, the absolute value of the average analyst forecast accuracy in Cheng et al. (2016) is 1.241 
and 1.077, respectively, for two samples.  
67 
 
Table 16 reports the results of voluntary KPI disclosure effect on analyst forecast accuracy. 
Column 1 and 2 presents the results of Heckman regressions. In Column 1, I use M_KPI as the 
dependent variable and use the estimated coefficients to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). 
In Column 2, I use future Accuracy as the dependent variable, use this quarter’s M_KPI as the 
variable of interest, and include IMR in the model. As shown in Column 2, the coefficient on 
managers’ KPI disclosure (M_KPI) is significantly positive, supporting my prediction that analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy improves following managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure. The result 
also indicates economic significance of managerial KPI disclosure, representing a 4.2% increase 
of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy following KPI disclosure in conference calls. The 
significant coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) suggests that the endogeneity issue is 
significant in the models. The signs of control variables are largely consistent with expectations. 
The coefficient on the forecast accuracy for current quarter’s earnings is positive and significant, 
suggesting that financial analysts have a relatively persistent ability to estimate a firm’s future 
performance. The coefficient on A_KPI_PastQtrs is significantly negative, consistent with the 
argument that when analysts have difficulty forecasting a firm’s earnings, they are more likely to 
ask about KPIs and collect supplemental information during conference calls. The coefficients on 
Accruals and RetVol are significantly negative, suggesting that it is more difficult to make accurate 
forecasts when the firm has higher total accruals or stock return volatility. And FollowingAnalysts 
has significantly positive coefficients, consistent with the consensus forecast becoming more 
accurate when there are more financial analysts producing earnings forecasts for the firm.  
While my main test is conducted using Heckman two-stage models, I also report the 
coefficients estimated using OLS regression in Column 3, since OLS regression is more robust 
than Heckman’s approach (Lennox et al. 2012). I find that after controlling for A_KPI_PastQtrs 
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and other firm characteristics, the coefficient on M_KPI is significantly positive and has similar 
magnitude to that in Column 2. In summary, the analyses support my H3 that the analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy is higher when managers voluntarily disclose KPI-related information in the past 
quarter. 
4.3.4 Results for Hypothesis H4 
 In this section, I examine whether the effect of voluntary KPI disclosure is more 
pronounced when the KPI disclosure is motivated by the demand from financial analysts. Table 
17 presents the results of my H4. Column 1 and 2 report the results of Heckman two-stage 
regressions. In Column 1, I use M_KPI_Motivated as the dependent variable and use the estimated 
coefficients to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). In Column 2, I use M_KPI_Motivated as 
the variable of interest and include IMR in the model. I find that after controlling for M_KPI, the 
coefficient on M_KPI_Motivated is significantly positive, consistent with my prediction that the 
H3 effect is more pronounced when the KPI disclosure was motivated by analyst demand. The 
coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) is significant, suggesting that the endogeneity issue 
is not trivial in the models. Moreover, I report the results of OLS regression in Column 3. The 
significantly positive coefficient of M_KPI_Motivated also supports my H4 that the effect of KPI 
disclosure is more significant when financial analysts expressed their demand for the disclosure in 
prior earnings calls.37  
4.3.5 Additional Analyses 
 
 
37 The coefficient on M_KPI is positive but only significant in the OLS regression results. This is consistent 
with my prediction that the results for M_KPI become less significant after including M_KPI_Motivated in 
the model.  
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 In Table 18, I reconduct my H3 analysis for each individual industry. I find that in most 
industries (i.e., energy, mining, retail, and high-tech industries), financial analysts tend to make 
more accurate earnings forecasts when they receive KPI-related information from managers’ 
presentations in earnings calls. While the coefficients on M_KPI are significantly positive for these 
industries, the magnitude of the coefficient varies across subgroups. For example, the coefficient 
on M_KPI for the mining industry is 0.429. While the high-tech industry has the smallest  
coefficient on M_KPI, its result is the most significant (0.077, t=3.255). The exceptions are the 
airline industry and real estate industry. For these two industries, the coefficients on M_KPI are 
not significant. A potential reason might be the relatively small sample size of the two subgroups. 
 I further examine whether the demand from financial analysts plays an important role in 
the impact of KPI disclosure in all industries. Table 19 documents the impact of analyst demand 
on the effect of voluntary KPI disclosure. Interestingly, while the coefficients on 
M_KPI_Motivated are positive in most industries (i.e., mining, real estate, retail, and high-tech 
industries), the effect is significant only for the subgroup of high-tech industry. This is consistent 
with the especially important role of financial analysts in facilitating market participants’ 
understanding of high-tech firms which usually have innovative and complicated business models 
and rely on often unrecognized intangible assets (Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Srivastava, 2014; Barth 
et al., 2001).   
 In Table 20, I use alternative measures of managerial KPI disclosure to test hypotheses H3 
and H4. In the main analysis, I use an indicator variable (M_KPI) to measure whether managers 
voluntarily disclose KPIs in their presentations. As introduced in Section 3.2.4, the intensity of 
managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure can be captured using two continuous variables, the logarithm 
of one plus the number of words covered by the sentences related to KPIs in the managerial 
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presentation (M_KPI_Words) and the logarithm of one plus the number of KPIs mentioned in the 
managerial presentation (M_KPI_Mentions). Moreover, Simpson (2010) emphasizes the 
importance of persistent disclosure of nonfinancial information in the wireless industry. I thus 
construct an indicator variable for persistent disclosure (M_KPI_Persist), which equals one if 
management persistently makes KPI-related disclosures in the presentation sections of calls held 
in the past four quarters, and zero otherwise. Since the Heckman two-stage approach requires the 
dependent variable in the choice model to be an indicator variable, I only conduct OLS regressions 
for the alternative measures of KPI disclosure. Columns 1 to 3 report the results for H3. The 
coefficients on my variables of interest (i.e., M_KPI_Words, M_KPI_Mentions, and 
M_KPI_Persist) remain significantly positive, supporting my argument that managers’ voluntary 
KPI disclosure leads to an improvement in the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Columns 
4 to 6 report the results for H4. The significantly positive coefficients on M_KPI_Motivated are 
consistent with my H4 that the effect of KPI disclosure is more significant when financial analysts 
expressed their demand for the disclosure in prior earnings calls.  
 A caveat in my interpretation of the results is the difficulty of controlling for all other 
disclosure channels. Although I follow prior studies and control for some variables related to 
analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, the increase in analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy may be 
driven by managers’ improvement in other disclosure channels. For example, the manager’s 
voluntary disclosure of KPIs during conference calls may happen simultaneously with the firm 
improving the quality of its financial reporting which facilitates analysts’ estimation about the 




 In summary, the evidence reported in Section 4.3 is generally consistent with my prediction 
that managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure is associated with an increase in analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy in future quarters. Except the two industries with small sample size (i.e., airline 
and real estate), my finding holds for most industries covered by my KPI term list (i.e., energy, 
mining, retail, and high-tech). I further find that this effect is more pronounced when the KPI 
disclosure was motivated by analyst demand. The results for hypothesis H4 seem to be driven by 
the high-tech industry which is consistent with the especially important role played by financial 




CHAPTER 5  
Conclusion 
Using 39,302 earnings conference calls from 2006 to 2018, I find that managers’ KPI 
disclosure in earnings call presentations is significantly associated with the demand from financial 
analysts in past quarters. Specifically, I find that following analysts’ questions about industry-
specific KPIs in the Q&A sections of conference calls, managers are more likely to disclose KPI -
related information in future presentations, they tend to spend more words in the sentences talking 
about KPIs, and they cover more industry-specific KPIs in their future presentations. I also find 
that the effects are more evident when earnings relevance is low, when the firm faces fewer 
concerns about proprietary information leakage, and when the KPI demand is expressed by 
connected analysts.  
 I then examine whether and how managers’ voluntary KPI disclosure during conference 
calls improves the accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. I find a significantly positive 
association between KPI disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy. This result is robust using both 
OLS regressions and the Heckman two-stage approach. I further investigate whether the demand 
from financial analysts plays a role in the effect of KPI disclosure. While the effect is more 
pronounced when the KPI disclosure was motivated by analyst demand, the result seems to be 
driven by the high-tech industry. This is consistent with financial analysts being especially 
important in facilitating the investors’ and other stakeholders’ understanding of the innovative and 
complicated business of firms in high-tech industries.   
 This dissertation sheds light on the roles played by analysts in the absence of mandatory 
KPI disclosure standards, suggesting that the demand from market participants (i.e., financial 
analysts) at least to some extent can motivate corporate KPI disclosure. My study is of interest to 
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standard setters and regulators considering the debate about integrating and mandating KPI 
disclosure. My findings imply the existence of a well-functioning demand-supply mechanism of 
KPI disclosure, suggesting that the regulation of KPI disclosure may not be necessary.  
 This dissertation also adds to research about the impact of voluntary KPI disclosure on 
analyst earnings forecast accuracy. While Givoly et al. (2019) document that analysts’ forecasts 
of KPIs are more accurate than their estimates of earnings numbers, my study extends their 
findings by investigating the usefulness of KPI-related information in improving earnings forecasts, 
a potential spillover effect of voluntary KPI disclosure. My study contributes to the KPI literature 
and the analyst literature by showing that analysts integrate industry-specific KPIs, which are 
usually leading indicators for future financial performance, to generate one of their most important 
outputs, earnings forecasts. 
This dissertation opens the potential for future research about KPIs. I plan to survey firm 
managers and financial analysts to further understand how they choose and interpret different KPIs. 
My study can also be extended by investigating the real effect of KPI disclosure on different 
stakeholders’ decisions, such as the investors’ investment decisions and the potential creditors’ 
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List of KPIs  
If not specified, the source of the KPIs is I/B/E/S KPI database. 
KPI Description 
Airline 
Available Seat Miles 
(Available Seat Kilometers) 
ASM. The passenger-carrying capacity during the period, which equals 
the number of miles traveled multiplied by the number of seats available. 
Revenue per Available Seat 
Miles (Revenue per Available 
Seat Kilometers) 
RASM. The average passenger revenue generated per available seat 
mile. 
Cost per Available Seat Miles 
(Cost per Available Seat 
Kilometers) CASM. The average operating cost per available seat mile. 
Load Factor 
The number of miles traveled by passengers divided by total available 
seat miles. 
Energy 
Realized Price The average price received per unit during the period. 
Maintenance Capex  
The investments required to maintain existing physical assets for 
operating.  
Lease Operating Expense  
The costs incurred to maintain and operate an active well and its 
associated equipment producing oil and gas.  
Production Tax  A valued based tax applied to the production of oil and gas. 
Production Expense  Production expense. 
Proven Reserve 
The quantity of energy sources reserved estimated using geologic and 
engineering data. 
Total Production Total production. 
High-tech 
Traffic Acquisition Cost 
TAC. The payments made that direct consumer and business traffic to 
websites.  
Burn Rate 
The amount of cash consumed by the firm during the period. [Source: 
Internet (a)]38 
Retention Rate 
(The number of customers-The number of new customers acquired)/The 
number of customers at the start of the period*100. [Source: Internet (a)]  
Life Time Value 
 LTV. The estimated average revenue that a customer brings throughout 












The percentage of a firm’s revenue expected to continue in the future. 
[Source: Internet (b)]39 
Net Promoter Score 
An index ranging from -100 to 100 that measures the willingness of 
customers to recommend a firm’s products or services to others. 
[Source: Internet (a)] 
Average Revenue per Unit  
The amount of money a firm expects to receive from selling one unit of 
product. 
Churn Rate Customer turnover. 
Customer Acquisition Cost 
(Subscriber Acquisition Cost) The average cost incurred to acquire a new customer. 
Daily Active User (Daily 
User) 
DAU. The number of users per day who take an action in a website or 
app. [Source: Internet (c)]40  
Web Traffic 
The amount of data sent and received by visitors in a website. [Source: 
Literature] (Trueman et al., 2001) 
Penetration Rate 
The number of subscribers scaled by the population size of the target 
market. [Source: Literature] (Amir and Lev (1996) 
Market Share Market share. [Source: Literature] (Simpson, 2010) 
Average Revenue per User 
The amount of money that a firm expects to generate from an individual 
customer. [Source: Literature] (Simpson, 2010) 
Network Traffic The amount of data moving across a network at a given point of time. 
Mining 
Production Cost  The costs incurred to manufacture a product or provide a service. 
Average Price The average price of the products during the period. 
Realized Price (Realized 
Gold/Copper/Silver Price) 
The final price the product or service is sold, calculated by excluding all 
applicable discounts, rebates, shopper rewards, coupon discounts from 
list price.  
Total Production Total production. 
Silver Equivalent Production The value of production converted to equivalent silver amount. 
Copper Production  Total production of cooper. 
Silver Production  Total production of silver. 
Zinc Production  Total production of zinc. 




39  Chepul (2020). “Top 22 KPI Examples for Technology Companies.” Available at 
https://www.rhythmsystems.com/blog/top-22-kpi-examples-for-technology-companies 








Backlog The quantity or value of products ordered by a customer but not shipped yet. 
Development Cost Development expense. 
Home Sale Sale of home. 
Land Sale Sale of land. 
Lot Sale Sale of lots. 
Occupancy Rate The ratio of rented or used space to the total amount of available space.  
Vacancy Rate 
The vacancy rate is the percentage of all available units in a rental property, 
such as a hotel or apartment, that are vacant or unoccupied. 
Retail 
Same-Store Sale 
Same-Store Sales. A percentage sales growth for retail stores that have been 
open for more than one year (or over another time period defined by the 
reporting firm).  
Number of Store Total number of open stores.  
Floor Space  Total floor space of stores. 
Number of Stores Opened Number of stores opened during the period.  
Retail Sale Revenue from retail sales (i.e., the number excludes wholesale sales).  
Stores Closed Total number of stores closed or relocated during the period.  
Franchise Fee  Franchise expense. 
Licensing Fee  Licensing expense. 




The Construction of KPI List & Industry Classification 
This appendix summarizes the process to construct my list of industry-specific KPIs. I start with the 
full list of industry-specific performance measures in the I/B/E/S KPI database, which covers 147 
measures across ten industries.41 I then exclude the KPIs of banking industry and combine the technology 
and telecommunications industries into the high-tech industry. Then, according to my definition of KPIs, 
I exclude the performance measures that are available in financial statements (GAAP measures), such as 
the net operating income for real estate industry and the rent expense for retail industry. Next, I refer to 
the literature and add to my list the KPIs documented as value relevant. Then, due to the importance of 
the high-tech industry in recent decades and the small number of high-tech related KPIs (eight KPIs in 
I/B/E/S), I collect some KPIs for the high-tech industry from the internet. The resulting list contains 131 
KPIs for seven industries.  
Next, I link the earnings call transcripts with the firm-quarters belonging to the seven industries 
identified by my KPI list based on their SIC industry code. Specifically, I determine the SIC codes of 
airline, energy, pharmacy, and real estate industries based on Fama-French 48 industry classifications; 
and the retail and mining industries based on Fama-French 17 industry classifications (Fama and French, 
1997).42 I then follow Kile and Phillips (2009)’s three digit SIC code combination to identify high-tech 
firms.43  
Furthermore, I conduct key word searching using Python for all the 131 KPI terms across the earnings 
call transcripts held by their corresponding industries.44 I then exclude the KPIs that have been discussed 
by managers (analysts) in less than ten (five) conference calls from my list. My final list of KPIs contains 
 
 
41  I/B/E/S KPI database classifies analysts’ KPI forecasts into ten industries: airlines, banking & investment 
services, energy, insurance, mining, pharmaceuticals & healthcare, real estate, retail, technology, and 
telecommunications. 
42 I refer to both 17 and 48 industry portfolios since the scope where the KPIs are applicable varies across different 
industries. For example, the KPIs of airline industry may not be applied to other industries in the transportation 
industry covered by Fama French 17 industry portfolios. 
43 Kile and Phillips (2009) classify high-tech sector into hardware, software, medical technology, communications, 
electronic manufacturing, and Internet subgroups. I exclude the medical technology subgroup from my sample 
since this subgroup is likely to be related to pharmacy industry, which is not covered by my KPI list.  
44 I explain the key word searching process in detail in Appendix C. 
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51 KPIs for six industries (i.e., airlines, energy, mining, real estate, retail, and high-tech). Appendix A 
shows my list of KPIs and their resources. 41 (80.4%) of the KPIs are covered by I/B/E/S KPI database; 
four KPIs are collected from the literature; and finally, six KPIs for the high-tech industry are collected 
from the internet. The following table summarizes my industry classification in detail: 
Industry SIC codes 
Airline 4500 - 4599 
Energy (Oil and gas equipment 
and services in I/B/E/S KPI) 
1200 – 1399, 2900 - 2999 
Mining 1000 – 1099, 1200 – 1299, 1400 – 1499, 5050-5052 
Pharmacy 2830 – 2831, 2833 – 2836 
Real Estate 6500, 6510, 6512 – 6515, 6517-6519, 6520-6532, 6540-
6541, 6550-6553, 6590-6599, 6610-6611 
Retail 5200 – 5959, 5970 – 5999 
High-tech (three-digit SIC) 366, 481, 482, 484, 489 (Communications); 355, 357 
(Hardware); 737 (Software); 596, 641, 731, 733, 736, 








Examples of Conference Call Transcript Text Coding 
  As mentioned in Appendix B, I conduct key word searching using Python for all the 131 KPI 
terms across the earnings call transcripts held by their corresponding industries. The contents of each 
conference call transcript are divided into multiple pieces in order. Each piece of text comprises the 
sentences of one speaker until another speaker starts to talk. The transcripts covered by my sample have 
3,609,414 pieces of texts in total. For each piece of text, the key word searching process determines 
whether a specific KPI is mentioned by the speaker. Using the flag variable of speaker types, I identify 
the pieces of text belonging to the presentation provided by executives at the beginning of the call and 
those from the Q&A section which contains conversations between managers and analysts.    
 Before searching for the key words across the texts, I conduct text preprocessing to improve the 
efficiency and accuracy of the matching between KPIs and the mentions by conference call participates. 
For example, I tokenize each text to break it into separate words to prepare to other preprocessing 
treatments; I then convert all the characters into their lower case; and finally, I stem the words to reduce 
inflection to their root forms. To better clarify this process and the following key word searching results, 
I provide several examples of the original and preprocessed texts during earnings conference calls. 
 
Example 1. A manager’s discussion about KPIs in his/her presentation.  
Continental Airlines' Second Quarter 2007 Earnings Conference Call held on July 19, 2007. 
[Original text] The KPI mentioned is costs per available seat mile for airline industry. 
“Thanks, Jeff, and again thanks to all of you for joining us this morning. Well despite all of our weather 
and ATC operational challenges, we're pretty pleased with our second quarter results. Revenue came in 
a bit stronger than we initially expected, and we continue to work the cost side of the ledger. … So on 
the cost side, on a year-over-year basis, the increase in same quarter costs was primarily attributable to 
increased flying, higher maintenance costs and increase in profit-sharing and other variable compensation. 
Our second quarter mainline costs per available seat mile, is CASM, on a GAAP basis, increased $0.09 
on 1% year-over-year. Excluding special items and holding fuel rate constant, mainline CASM was up 
1.5% year-over-year, which was a little better than our guidance. Looking ahead to the third quarter, we 
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expect our mainline CASM, again including special items and holding fuel rate constant, to be up about 
3% year-over-year. As I mentioned last quarter, throughout 2007, we'll continue to see pressure on the 
maintenance line as our fleet ages and a larger number of heavy checks are needed. We also have some 
program escalations in our aircraft maintenance contracts but we are working on a couple of initiatives 
to offset some of these increases and hope to have some of those initiatives in place by year end. We'll 
also see some increase in the wage and benefit line due to increased volume variable pay and our 2% 
compensation increase for all work groups that agreed to reductions in 2005 which went into effect earlier 
this month. Our cost pressures will be partially offset by improvements in our regional jet economics as 
we complete the transition of part of our regional flying to Chautauqua. Larry mentioned our current plan 
to scale back mainline growth a bit next year. That of course will put some additional pressure on CASM 
but we think it's the right thing to do in the current environment.” 
 
[Preprocessed text] The KPI mentioned is converted to cost per avail seat mile for airline industry. 
“thank , jeff , and again thank to all of you for join us thi morn . well despit all of our weather and atc 
oper challeng , we 're pretti pleas with our second quarter result . revenu came in a bit stronger than we 
initi expect , and we continu to work the cost side of the ledger . … so on the cost side , on a year-over-
year basi , the increas in same quarter cost wa primarili attribut to increas fli , higher mainten cost and 
increas in profit-shar and other variabl compens . our second quarter mainlin cost per avail seat mile , is 
casm , on a gaap basi , increas $ 0.09 on 1 % year-over-year . exclud special item and hold fuel rate 
constant , mainlin casm wa up 1.5 % year-over-year , which wa a littl better than our guidanc . look ahead 
to the third quarter , we expect our mainlin casm , again includ special item and hold fuel rate constant , 
to be up about 3 % year-over-year . as i mention last quarter , throughout 2007 , we 'll continu to see 
pressur on the mainten line as our fleet age and a larger number of heavi check are need . we also have 
some program escal in our aircraft mainten contract but we are work on a coupl of initi to offset some of 
these increas and hope to have some of those initi in place by year end . we 'll also see some increas in 
the wage and benefit line due to increas volum variabl pay and our 2 % compens increas for all work 
group that agre to reduct in 2005 which went into effect earlier thi month . our cost pressur will be partial 
offset by improv in our region jet econom as we complet the transit of part of our region fli to chautauqua . 
larri mention our current plan to scale back mainlin growth a bit next year . that of cours will put some 




Example 2. The discussion between an analyst and a manager during the Q&A section.  
Marchex’s Fourth Quarter 2005 Earnings Conference Call held on February 23, 2006. 
[Original text] The KPI mentioned is traffic acquisition cost for high-tech industry. 
The analyst’s question is “Sure, a final question, your gross margin seems to have increased, improved 
dramatically, we also heard that on Yahoo’s call that traffic acquisition costs for them was going up.  
Could you comment of there was a change in revenue splits of payouts or any other trends that you saw 
there?” 
The manager’s answer is “The trends have been pretty consistent with us in terms of kind of what we 
saw through the year, and we see happening in 2006, John touched on it.  Highly quality third -party 
distribution, it’s always competitive and; you do a better job, you are going to keep your partners and I 
think we’ve been doing that.  And on the other side of it we clearly benefit as a large and increasingly 
growing traffic owner, because we know that, the more traffic you have the more control you have of 
your own destiny.  So overall trend feel pretty consistent with what they were and, for us we think that 
creates a pretty right environment for this year.” 
 
[Preprocessed text] The KPI mentioned is converted to traffic acquisit cost for high-tech industry. 
The analyst’s question is “sure , a final question , your gross margin seem to have increas , improv dramat , 
we also heard that on yahoo ’ s call that traffic acquisit cost for them wa go up . could you comment of 
there wa a chang in revenu split of payout or ani other trend that you saw there ?” 
The manager’s answer is “the trend have been pretti consist with us in term of kind of what we saw 
through the year , and we see happen in 2006 , john touch on it . highli qualiti third-parti distribut , it ’ s 
alway competit and ; you do a better job , you are go to keep your partner and i think we ’ ve been do 
that . and on the other side of it we clearli benefit as a larg and increasingli grow traffic owner , becaus 
we know that , the more traffic you have the more control you have of your own destini . so overal trend 






M_KPI Indicator variable, which equals one if the firm’s executives make any 
voluntary KPI disclosure during the presentation section in its earnings 
call. 
M_KPI_Mentions The natural log one plus the number of KPIs mentioned by managers 
during the presentation. 
M_KPI_Words The natural log of one plus the number of words covered by the 
sentences related to KPIs in managerial presentation. 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy Indicator variable, which equals one if the firm's executives have made 
any voluntary KPI disclosure during the presentation sections of 
earnings calls in quarter t-8 to t-1. 
M_KPI_Motivated Indicator variable, which equals one only if managers provide KPI 
disclosure after analysts request the information in the past quarter. 
M_PresentationWords 
 
The natural log of one plus the total number of words in the prepared 
presentation of the earnings call. 
Answer_KPI 
 
Indicator variable, which equals one if the firm’s executives make any 




Indicator variable, which equals one if the firm's executives have made 
any KPI disclosure during the Q&A sections of earnings calls in 
quarter t-8 to t-1. 
A_KPI Indicator variable, which equals one if analysts ask at least one 
question about KPIs during the Q&A section of the earnings call. 




The natural log of one plus the number of KPI-related questions during 
the Q&A section of the earnings call. 
A_KPI_Questions_PastQtrs 
 
The natural log of one plus the total number of KPI-related questions 
from quarter t-8 to quarter t-1. 
A_All_Questions 
 
The natural log of one plus the number of questions raised by analysts 
during the Q&A section of the earnings call. 
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs 
 
The natural log of one plus the average number of questions asked 
from quarter t-8 to quarter t-1. 
A_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 
 
Indicator variable, which equals one if analysts have asked about KPIs 




Appendix D. (Continued)  
Variable Definition 
LowRelev Indicator variable, which equals one if the firm has earnings relevance 
below the median by industry and quarter. 
Fluidity The measure of proprietary cost based on textual analysis of 10-K filings 
(Hoberg, et al., 2014). 
A_Access Indicator variable, which equals one if at least one of the analysts asking 
about KPI-related information was invited to ask the first question in any 
of the earnings calls held in the past four quarters.  
A_Access_PastQtrs Indicator variable, which equals one if at least one of the analysts asking 
about KPI-related information in quarter t-8 to quarter t-1has connectivity 
to firm management.  
Accuracy The negative value of the absolute difference between actual earnings per 
share and the consensus of earnings per share forecast, scaled by the actual 
stock price. 
Size The natural log of one plus total asset. 
Loss Indicator variable for loss firms. 
Accruals The absolute accrual value scaled by the absolute net operating cash flow. 




Standardized earnings surprise calculated using the analyst forecasts and 
actuals reported by I/B/E/S (actual earnings per share minus expected 
earnings per share, scaled by adjusted stock price). 
RetVol The standard deviation of monthly stock returns in the past 12 months. 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
MB Market-to-book ratio. 
IO The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. 
FollowingAnalysts The natural log of one plus the number of analysts following the firm. 
PastRet 
 
The firm’s past stock return (PastRet), which is the stock return from two 
month before to one month after the quarter end. 
BVPS The book value per share scaled by stock price (BVPS). 





Figure 1. Investors’ Use of Information 
Panel A. Percentage of Information Used by Investors (Lev and Gu, 2016, Chapter 4, Figure 4.1) 
 
 





Figure 2. The Scope of KPIs 
Panel A. CFA’s schematic for performance measures 
 




Figure 2. (Continued) 




Figure 3. Prevalence of KPIs in Conference Calls 
Panel A. Time Trend of Analysts’ interest in KPIs during S&P 500 firms’ earnings calls. 
 
 
This graph shows the time trend of analysts’ interest in KPI-related information. In attempt to address the changing 
sample over time, I focus on the earnings calls held by S&P500 firms in the six industries identified in this paper; 













2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Time Trend of Analysts' Interest in KPIs
# of KPI-related Questions
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Figure 3. (Continued) 
Panel B. Percent of Observations with Managerial Mentioning of the KPIs. 
 
 
This graph shows displays the frequency of KPIs mentioned in managerial presentations of their corresponding 













Airline KPIs Energy KPIs Hightech KPIs Mining KPIs Realestate KPIs Retail KPIs
Industry-KPI Matching in Managerial Presentations
Calls of other industries Calls of  the corresponding industry
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Figure 3. (Continued) 
Panel C. Percent of Observations with Analyst Mentioning of the KPIs. 
 
 
This graph shows displays the frequency of KPIs mentioned by analysts during the conference calls held by their 
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Industry-KPI Matching in Analyst Questions
Calls of other industries Calls of the corresponding industry
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Table 1. Initial Sample Selection Process 
Panel A. Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Criteria Sample Size 
All conference call transcripts in S&P Global 
Market database during 2006-2018 
229,374 transcripts 
Restrict to earnings conference calls with Q&A 
sections 
179,758 transcripts 
Restrict to earnings conference calls held by US 
firms 
120,180 firm-quarters for 5,460 unique firms 
Merge with Compustat and CRSP 115,982 firm-quarters for 5,200 unique firms 
Restrict to the six industries examined in this 
dissertation 
43,421 firm-quarters for 1,999 unique firms 
Require non-missing value of regression variables 
in Equation (1) 
39,302 firm-quarters for 1,846 unique firms 
 
Panel B. Distribution of Sample by Industry 
Industry Firm-quarters Unique Firms 
Airline 714 25  
Energy 5,029 246  
High-tech 24,555 1,184  
Mining 1,265 66 
Real Estate 410 30  





Table 2. Distribution of transcripts with KPI mentioning by managers and analysts 
Panel A. Distribution of KPI Mentioning by Industry 
Industry # of transcripts # of Managers # of Analysts 
Airline 714 438 401 
Energy 5,029 2,453 623 
High-tech 24,555 11,106 4,780 
Mining 1,265 848 318 
Real Estate 410 223 78 
Retail 7,329 5,430 2,962 
Total 39,302 20,498 9,162 
 
Panel B. Distribution of KPI Mentioning by Year 
Year # of transcripts # of Managers # of Analysts 
2006 332 195 96 
2007 675 381 206 
2008 2,434 1,363 617 
2009 3,209 1,797 818 
2010 3,463 1,904 828 
2011 3,780 1,962 887 
2012 3,852 2,026 875 
2013 3,829 1,992 869 
2014 3,816 1,925 850 
2015 3,751 1,920 879 
2016 3,451 1,730 727 
2017 3,422 1,671 779 
2018 3,288 1,632 731 
Total 39,302 20,498 9,162 
 
This table reports the distribution of earnings calls, the distribution of earnings calls during which the managers 
voluntarily disclosed KPI-related information during the presentation sections, and the distribution of earnings 







Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variable # of obs. Mean 25P Median 75P Min Max Std. 
M_KPI 39,302 0.522 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
M_KPI_Words 39,302 1.851 0.000 0.000 3.892 0.000 6.977 2.120 
M_KPI_Mentions 39,302 0.697 0.000 0.000 1.386 0.000 4.533 0.849 
A_KPI 39,302 0.233 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.428 
A_KPI_PastQtrs 39,302 0.729 0.000 0.693 1.099 0.000 2.398 0.676 
A_KPI_Questions 39,302 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.565 0.392 
A_KPI_Questions_PastQtrs 39,302 0.643 0.000 0.527 1.125 0.000 2.835 0.612 
Answer_KPI 39,302 0.286 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.452 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 39,302 0.706 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.456 
Fluidity 35,886 6.487 4.359 5.918 7.808 0.510 23.905 3.159 
LowRelev 39,128 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
A_Access 39,302 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.230 
A_Access_PastQtrs 39,302 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 8.000 0.828 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 39,302 0.752 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.432 
A_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 39,302 0.622 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.485 
M_PresentationWords 39,302 7.917 7.685 7.953 8.193 1.609 10.088 0.422 
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs 39,302 3.041 2.708 3.091 3.434 0.693 4.956 0.584 
Size 39,302 7.101 5.835 7.081 8.265 3.003 11.591 1.788 
Loss 39,302 0.309 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.462 
Accruals 39,302 1.569 0.358 0.619 1.142 0.022 29.455 3.755 
ROA 39,302 0.002 -0.005 0.009 0.021 -0.234 0.087 0.043 
SUE 39,302 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 -3.693 9.605 0.079 
RetVol 39,302 0.122 0.076 0.106 0.149 0.036 0.389 0.065 
Leverage 39,302 0.496 0.321 0.485 0.638 0.075 1.273 0.239 
MB 39,302 3.061 1.257 2.117 3.697 -17.350 30.134 4.888 
IO 39,302 0.681 0.503 0.762 0.903 0.001 1.  0.299 





Table 4. Determinants of Analyst KPI Demand 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable =  A_KPI A_Access 
M_KPI 0.264*** 0.201***  
(11.690) (6.043) 
M_PresentationWords -0.039 -0.072* 
 (-1.460) (-1.851) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.123*** 0.121***  
(4.009) (2.614) 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.071*** 0.037  
(2.706) (0.947) 
A_All_Questions 0.443*** 0.204***  
(20.741) (6.790) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.472*** 0.433***  
(21.524) (14.431) 
Loss 0.012 0.041  
(0.496) (1.115) 
Accruals -0.059 -0.244  
(-0.506) (-1.383) 
Size -0.010 -0.019  
(-0.990) (-1.360) 
FollowingAnalysts 0.033 -0.118***  
(1.623) (-4.184) 
Fluidity 0.008** 0.015** 
 (2.073) (2.562) 
LowRelev -0.037* -0.034 
 (-1.708) (-1.138) 
ROA 0.378 1.069** 
 (1.296) (2.240) 
SUE -0.030 -0.217  
(-0.403) (-1.315) 
MB 0.003* 0.003 
 
(1.952) (1.412) 
Leverage 0.075 -0.010 
 (1.542) (-0.154) 
IO -0.033 -0.035 
 (-0.793) (-0.566) 
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes 
Constant -2.546*** -1.870*** 
 (-10.407) (-5.461) 
Observations 35,787 35,787 
Pseudo R-squared 0.138 0.117 
This table reports the determinants of analysts’ interest in KPIs. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. The Effects of Analyst Demand on Managerial Voluntary KPI Disclosure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable =  M_KPI M_KPI_Words M_KPI_Mentions 
     
A_KPI_PastQtrs 0.299*** 0.310*** 0.245*** 
  (10.221) (9.305) (11.052) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 1.213*** 0.930*** 0.498*** 
  (33.304) (29.374) (25.881) 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.309*** 0.335*** 0.184*** 
 (9.438) (10.104) (8.807) 
M_PresentationWords 0.641*** 0.718*** 0.359*** 
  (13.832) (16.132) (12.858) 
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs -0.051** -0.079*** -0.010 
  (-1.973) (-2.902) (-0.591) 
Size -0.065*** -0.078*** -0.055*** 
  (-3.935) (-4.445) (-4.811) 
Loss 0.015 0.038 0.010 
  (0.463) (1.153) (0.541) 
Accruals 0.083 0.022 -0.076 
  (0.614) (0.158) (-0.917) 
ROA 0.831** 0.699** 0.557*** 
  (2.470) (2.252) (2.940) 
SUE 0.205 0.170*** 0.135*** 
 (1.444) (2.588) (4.097) 
RetVol 0.382 0.528** 0.034 
  (1.592) (2.003) (0.213) 
Leverage 0.094 0.104 0.187*** 
  (1.219) (1.227) (3.264) 
MB 0.004 0.004 0.002 
  (1.524) (1.436) (1.126) 
IO -0.017 0.000 0.008 
  (-0.261) (0.002) (0.177) 
FollowingAnalysts 0.001 0.005 -0.016 
  (0.0312) (0.150) (-0.710) 
    
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant -6.239*** -3.306*** -2.521*** 
 (-16.493) (-8.012) (-10.070) 
Observations 39,302 39,302 39,302 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared  0.201 0.244 0.349 
This table reports regressions of analyst demand in the past eight quarters on managerial KPI disclosure. t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.
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 Table 6. The Impact of Earnings Relevance on Analyst Demand Effects 
Independent Variable (IV) = LowRelev  Loss Accruals 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs 0.318*** 0.322*** 0.260*** 0.279*** 0.283*** 0.250*** 0.245*** 0.273*** 0.222*** 
  (17.463) (20.222) (29.713) (17.478) (20.086) (32.273) (13.489) (16.981) (25.127) 
IV -0.079*** -0.046** -0.048*** -0.021 -0.031 0.022 -0.094*** -0.076*** -0.029** 
 (-3.374) (-2.244) (-4.227) (-0.735) (-1.229) (1.582) (-3.918) (-3.604) (-2.537) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs * IV 0.049** 0.024 0.031*** 0.049* 0.094*** -0.016 0.097*** 0.074*** 0.047*** 
 (2.081) (1.154) (2.708) (1.864) (4.070) (-1.255) (4.099) (3.630) (4.150) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 1.215*** 0.929*** 0.499*** 1.212*** 0.929*** 0.498*** 1.209*** 0.926*** 0.496*** 
  (52.207) (50.302) (48.994) (52.382) (50.470) (49.157) (52.239) (50.244) (48.911) 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.314*** 0.339*** 0.186*** 0.308*** 0.334*** 0.184*** 0.306*** 0.333*** 0.182*** 
 (16.565) (20.319) (20.304) (16.293) (20.088) (20.144) (16.173) (20.019) (19.954) 
M_PresentationWords 0.644*** 0.719*** 0.359*** 0.641*** 0.718*** 0.359*** 0.642*** 0.720*** 0.360*** 
  (30.965) (42.490) (38.602) (30.919) (42.507) (38.648) (30.983) (42.600) (38.745) 
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs -0.052*** -0.081*** -0.011 -0.051*** -0.080*** -0.010 -0.051*** -0.078*** -0.009 
  (-3.197) (-5.658) (-1.359) (-3.124) (-5.576) (-1.263) (-3.112) (-5.484) (-1.192) 
          
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Constant -6.309*** -3.342*** -2.549*** -6.224*** -3.288*** -2.523*** -6.185*** -3.279*** -2.515*** 
 (-34.306) (-20.286) (-28.124) (-34.071) (-20.070) (-27.996) (-33.878) (-20.027) (-27.936) 
          
Observations 39,128 39,128 39,128 39,302 39,302 39,302 39,302 39,302 39,302 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0.192 0.244 0.349 0.192 0.244 0.349 0.201 0.244 0.349 
This table reports the impact analyst demand on managerial KPI disclosure conditional on the firm’s earnings relevance. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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 Table 7. The Impact of Proprietary Cost on Analyst Demand Effects  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable =  M_KPI M_KPI_Words M_KPI_Mentions 
A_KPI_PastQtrs 0.506*** 0.437*** 0.390*** 
  (8.331) (6.636) (8.237) 
Fluidity 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.014*** 
 (4.380) (2.932) (3.135) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs * Fluidity -0.025*** -0.014* -0.014** 
 (-3.226) (-1.721) (-2.354) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 1.255*** 0.965*** 0.548*** 
  (33.353) (28.252) (26.500) 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.222*** 0.286*** 0.112*** 
 (6.494) (8.240) (5.086) 
M_PresentationWords 0.639*** 0.725*** 0.373*** 
  (12.945) (15.414) (12.152) 
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs -0.092*** -0.104*** -0.048*** 
  (-3.356) (-3.627) (-2.621) 
    
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes 
    
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant -6.091*** -3.056*** -2.246*** 
 (-14.630) (-7.729) (-8.684) 
Observations 35,886 35,886 35,886 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0.185 0.236 0.306 
 
This table reports the impact analyst demand on managerial KPI disclosure conditional on the firm’s proprietary 
cost. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***,**, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 8. The Impact of Analysts’ Connectivity to Management on Analyst Demand Effects  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable = M_KPI M_KPI_Words M_KPI_Mentions 
A_KPI_PastQtrs 0.286*** 0.292*** 0.210*** 
  (9.884) (9.793) (11.245) 
A_Access_PastQtrs -0.222** -0.240* -0.356*** 
 (-1.983) (-1.841) (-4.126) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs* 
A_Access_PastQtrs 
0.228*** 0.221** 0.333*** 
 (2.871) (2.374) (5.292) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 1.260*** 0.965*** 0.549*** 
  (34.822) (29.633) (28.147) 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.226*** 0.288*** 0.125*** 
 (6.794) (8.600) (5.826) 
M_PresentationWords 0.650*** 0.726*** 0.369*** 
  (13.380) (15.792) (12.103) 
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs -0.092*** -0.106*** -0.053*** 
  (-3.448) (-3.729) (-2.941) 
    
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes 
    
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant -6.171*** -3.671*** -2.616*** 
 (-15.429) (-9.878) (-10.577) 
Observations 39,302 39, 302 39, 302 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0.186 0.239 0.313 
 
This table reports the impact analyst demand on managerial KPI disclosure conditional on whether the analysts 
raising KPI-related questions have private access to the management. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors 




Table 9. Subgroup Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent = M_KPI  Airline Energy Mining Real Estate Retail High-Tech 
        
A_KPI_PastQtrs 2.380*** 0.249*** 0.373*** 0.443* 0.267*** 0.281*** 
  (7.062) (3.551) (2.655) (1.801) (3.190) (8.737) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 1.547*** 1.771*** 0.827*** 1.792*** 1.832*** 0.943*** 
  (2.744) (19.744) (3.847) (3.793) (17.101) (24.578) 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 1.523*** 0.054 0.372** 0.943*** 0.399*** 0.319*** 
 (2.768) (0.813) (2.342) (4.675) (4.607) (8.393) 
M_PresentationWords 3.505*** 0.813*** 0.754*** 2.203*** 0.439*** 0.687*** 
  (7.364) (8.303) (3.569) (5.133) (3.057) (13.554) 
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs 0.322 -0.144** -0.057 0.489* 0.023 -0.105*** 
  (1.120) (-2.179) (-0.413) (1.799) (0.293) (-3.530) 
       
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant -31.057*** -7.460*** -6.951*** -17.947*** -4.966*** -6.143*** 
 (-11.218) (-9.007) (-4.468) (-5.143) (-4.428) (-14.600) 
       
Observations 712 5,029 1,255 403 7,328 25,180 
Pseudo R-squared 0.876 0.292 0.243 0.444 0.224 0.131 
This table reports subgroup analysis for each individual industry.  The model regresses analyst demand in the past eight quarters on managerial KPI 





Table 10. Subgroup Analysis with High-tech Industry Omitted 
Dependent Variable =  M_KPI M_KPI_Words M_KPI_Mentions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs 0.379*** 0.477*** 0.208*** 0.346*** 0.326*** 0.175*** 0.358*** 0.413*** 0.173*** 
  (12.448) (9.930) (6.833) (13.244) (8.052) (6.517) (23.310) (5.404) (11.010) 
LowRelev -0.153***   -0.086**   -0.096***   
 (-3.622)   (-2.330)   (-4.397)   
A_KPI_PastQtrs * LowRelev 0.076**   0.058*   0.073***   
 (1.968)   (1.761)   (3.810)   
Fluidity  0.058***   0.036***   0.024***  
  (9.132)   (6.593)   (7.382)  
A_KPI_PastQtrs * Fluidity  -0.024***   -0.010**   -0.012***  
  (-4.218)   (-2.145)   (-4.193)  
A_Access_PastQtrs   -0.076   -0.029   -0.231*** 
   (-0.910)   (-0.402)   (-5.484) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs * A_Access_PastQtrs   0.143**   0.096*   0.264*** 
   (2.402)   (1.894)   (8.922) 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -6.152*** -6.368*** -6.195*** -2.728*** -0.464 -3.646*** -2.588*** -1.917** -3.209*** 
 (-22.155) (-20.071) (-21.256) (-11.114) (-0.361) (-14.703) (-18.052) (-2.498) (-22.100) 
Observations 14,056 12,848 14,121 14,057 12,849 14,122 14,057 12,849 14,122 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared  0.291 0.309 0.295 0.270 0.286 0.280 0.387 0.406 0.399 
This table reports the cross-sectional analysis with high-tech firms omitted. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 




Table 11. The Effect of Analysts’ KPI Demand in the Past Quarters 
Dependent Variable = M_KPI    
Independent Variable = A_KPI in Quarter t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
A_KPI (in prior quarter) 0.292*** 0.262*** 0.240*** 0.251*** 0.248*** 0.215*** 0.216*** 0.207*** 
  (10.941) (9.794) (8.972) (9.220) (8.674) (7.267) (7.473) (6.897) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 1.270*** 1.295*** 1.323*** 1.328*** 1.337*** 1.344*** 1.361*** 1.353*** 
  (34.194) (33.450) (32.441) (31.281) (30.259) (29.901) (29.542) (29.003) 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.386*** 0.417*** 0.449*** 0.454*** 0.446*** 0.455*** 0.453*** 0.457*** 
 (11.972) (12.362) (12.638) (12.416) (11.731) (11.630) (11.242) (11.088) 
M_PresentationWords 0.625*** 0.628*** 0.625*** 0.640*** 0.638*** 0.625*** 0.638*** 0.627*** 
  (13.220) (12.977) (12.614) (12.670) (12.514) (12.000) (12.005) (11.621) 
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs -0.037 -0.040 -0.035 -0.036 -0.025 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 
 (-1.355) (-1.436) (-1.232) (-1.208) (-0.820) (-0.611) (-0.673) (-0.577) 
         
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant -6.195*** -6.276*** -6.319*** -6.487*** -6.524*** -6.437*** -6.551*** -6.465*** 
 
(-15.973) (-15.793) (-15.531) (-15.542) (-15.439) (-15.030) (-14.959) (-14.589) 
Observations 39,291 39,118 35,875 35,875 35,875 35,875 35,875 35,875 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared  
0.196 0.196 0.196 0.195 0.194 0.191 0.191 0.191 
 
This table reports the probit regressions using the analysts’ demand for KPI disclosure (A_KPI) in the past eight quarters, respectively, as 




Table 12. The Tests for Initial KPI Demand and Initial KPI Disclosure 
Test for 
Initial KPI disclosure (subgroup with no KPI 
disclosure in quarter t-1)  
Initial analyst demand and Initial KPI disclosure 
(subgroup with no KPI demand in quarter t-2 and 
no KPI disclosure in quarter t-1) 
Dependent Variable =  M_KPI M_KPI_Words M_KPI_Mentions M_KPI M_KPI_Words M_KPI_Mentions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A_KPI (in quarter t-1) 0.171*** 0.099*** 0.057*** 0.171*** 0.096*** 0.059*** 
  (5.142) (4.382) (5.311) (4.662) (3.822) (5.005) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.565*** 0.291*** 0.143*** 0.558*** 0.281*** 0.135*** 
  (17.410) (14.997) (18.097) (16.210) (14.102) (16.752) 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.257*** 0.142*** 0.069*** 0.240*** 0.130*** 0.062*** 
 (8.347) (7.645) (8.964) (7.444) (6.863) (7.890) 
M_PresentationWords 0.502*** 0.426*** 0.130*** 0.510*** 0.421*** 0.127*** 
  (12.946) (19.637) (14.744) (12.276) (19.059) (14.116) 
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs -0.004 -0.006 0.001 -0.028 -0.018 -0.005 
 (-0.140) (-0.300) (0.076) (-0.891) (-0.912) (-0.634) 
       
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant -5.261*** -1.662*** -1.043*** -5.172*** -1.524*** -0.940*** 
 (-15.422) (-7.994) (-11.711) (-14.249) (-6.854) (-9.843) 
Observations 15,032 15,032 15,032 12,642 12,642 12,642 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0.089 0.107 0.092 0.091 0.107 0.091 
 
This table reports the subgroup regressions using the analysts’ demand for KPI disclosure (A_KPI) in quarter t-1 as independent variables. 
Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 13. Alternative Selection of KPIs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable =  M_KPI M_KPI_Words M_KPI_Mentions 
     
A_KPI_PastQtrs 0.250*** 0.116*** 0.161*** 
  (7.528) (3.352) (6.878) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 1.168*** 0.688*** 0.359*** 
  (34.058) (26.874) (23.360) 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.240*** 0.208*** 0.110*** 
 (7.317) (7.991) (6.880) 
M_PresentationWords 0.435*** 0.397*** 0.162*** 
  (9.129) (10.789) (6.864) 
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs -0.037 -0.083*** -0.013 
  (-1.344) (-3.336) (-0.913) 
Size -0.045*** -0.034** -0.034*** 
  (-2.710) (-2.381) (-3.566) 
Loss 0.029 0.021 0.008 
  (0.893) (0.795) (0.594) 
Accruals -0.396*** -0.303** -0.253*** 
  (-2.718) (-2.539) (-3.745) 
ROA 1.137*** 0.599** 0.530*** 
  (3.249) (2.221) (3.375) 
SUE -0.020 -0.016 -0.019 
 (-0.244) (-0.305) (-0.694) 
RetVol 0.889*** 0.980*** 0.287** 
  (3.558) (4.107) (2.187) 
Leverage 0.125* -0.045 0.135*** 
  (1.651) (-0.620) (2.734) 
MB -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.453) (-0.276) (-0.512) 
IO 0.043 0.056 0.031 
  (0.655) (0.993) (0.971) 
FollowingAnalysts 0.030 0.058** 0.012 
  (0.912) (1.981) (0.705) 
    
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant -5.219*** -0.910*** -1.103*** 
 (-13.303) (-2.809) (-5.544) 
Observations 39,302 39,302 39,302 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared  0.247 0.227 0.363 
This table reports regressions of analyst demand in the past eight quarters on managerial KPI disclosure 
with measures generated using alternative KPI list. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 14. Alternative Measurement of Analysts’ KPI Demand 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable =  M_KPI M_KPI M_KPI M_KPI 
A_KPI_Questions_PastQtrs 0.337*** 0.315*** 0.565*** -0.226** 
  (10.194) (34.412) (8.276) (-2.073) 
LowRelev  -0.048***   
  (-4.421)   
A_KPI_PastQtrs * LowRelev  0.035***   
  (3.022)   
Fluidity   0.033***  
   (4.277)  
A_KPI_PastQtrs * Fluidity   -0.027***  
   (-3.069)  
A_Access_PastQtrs    0.562*** 
    (4.494) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs * 
A_Access_PastQtrs 
   
0.112*** 
    (2.901) 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -6.249*** -6.318*** -6.106*** -6.216*** 
 (-16.429) (-34.310) 
(-14.609) (-15.353) 
Observations 39,291 39,118 35,875 39,286 
Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared  0.203 0.203 0.187 0.189 
 
This table replicates the probit regressions in Table 5 to Table 8 using the number of KPI-related questions 
as an alternative measurement of analyst demand for KPI disclosure. Standard errors are clustered at firm 







Table 15. Summary Statistics    
Variable # of 
obs. 
Mean 25P Median 75P Min Max Std. 
M_KPI 31,502 0.524 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 
M_KPI_Motivated 29,090 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.367 
M_KPI_Words 31,502 0.692 0.000 0.693 1.099 0.000 4.533 0.813 
M_KPI_Mentions 31,502 2.954 1.792 2.197 4.143 0.693 7.030 1.391 
M_KPI_Persist 31,502 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.420 
Accuracy 31,502 -0.981 -0.784 -0.246 -0.080 -16.759 0.000 2.332 
A_KPI_PastQtrs 31,502 0.724 0.000 0.693 1.099 0.000 2.197 0.642 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dumm
y 
31,502 0.801 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.399 
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_D
ummy 
31,502 0.706 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.456 
M_PresentationWords 31,502 8.058 7.841 8.094 8.321 2.197 9.806 0.407 
A_All_Questions_PastQtr
s 
31,502 3.019 2.708 3.091 3.434 0.693 4.956 0.593 
Size 31,502 6.881 5.619 6.797 8.031 2.917 11.547 1.818 
Accruals 31,502 -0.084 -0.113 -0.066 -0.030 -0.624 0.150 0.106 
Loss 31,502 0.346 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.476 
ROA 31,502 -0.001 -0.008 0.008 0.020 -0.248 0.088 0.046 
MB 31,502 3.206 1.285 2.228 3.947 -21.672 33.849 5.722 
IO 31,502 0.676 0.485 0.762 0.904 0.001 1.192 0.303 
RetVol 31,502 0.125 0.078 0.109 0.153 0.036 0.397 0.067 
SUE 31,502 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 -3.693 9.605 0.079 
FollowingAnalysts 31,502 2.059 1.609 2.197 2.708 0.000 3.555 0.887 
Leverage 31,502 0.508 0.318 0.486 0.657 0.074 1.409 0.260 
PastRet 31,502 0.033 -0.130 0.021 0.175 -0.618 1.000 0.274 
BVPS 31,502 0.503 0.220 0.407 0.695 -0.884 2.568 0.481 
SalesGrowth 31,502 0.035 -0.045 0.023 0.094 -0.529 1.009 0.204 
 
This table presents the number of observations (N), mean value (Mean), 25th percentile, median value 
(Median),75th percentile, minimum (Min), maximum (Max), and standard deviation (Std.) for the variables 
used in the regressions. I winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% percentiles.  
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Table 16. The Effect of Voluntary KPI Disclosure on Analyst Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
 Heckman  OLS 
 Step 1 Step 2   
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable =  M_KPI Accuracy(t+1)  Accuracy(t+1) 
M_KPI  0.042**  0.060*** 
  (1.983)  (3.229) 
Accuracy  0.456***  0.462*** 
  (114.637)  (117.801) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs 0.269*** -0.050***  -0.041*** 
 (9.037) (-3.115)  (-2.632) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 3.032***    
 (35.812)    
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.267***    
 (7.152)    
M_PresentationWords 0.461***    
 (9.718)    
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs -0.049*    
 (-1.676)    
PastRet  0.566***  0.562*** 
  (15.358)  (15.209) 
BVPS  -0.177***  -0.203*** 
  (-7.291)  (-8.480) 
SalesGrowth  -0.096**  -0.091** 
  (-2.124)  (-2.017) 
Size -0.068*** -0.042***  -0.036*** 
  (-3.924) (-5.021)  (-4.334) 
Loss -0.019 -0.307***  -0.291*** 
  (-0.554) (-14.191)  (-13.472) 
Accruals -0.139 -0.826***  -0.845*** 
  (-0.957) (-7.622)  (-7.794) 
SUE 0.202 1.798***  1.656*** 
 (1.491) (15.528)  (14.831) 
RetVol 0.539** -3.145***  -3.175*** 
  (2.004) (-17.662)  (-17.804) 
Leverage 0.138* -0.606***  -0.647*** 
  (1.687) (-13.891)  (-14.775) 
FollowingAnalysts 0.012 0.257***  0.253*** 
  (0.348) (14.025)  (13.795) 
ROA 0.567    
  (1.556)    
MB 0.004*    
  (1.646)    
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Table 16. (Continued) 
 Heckman  OLS 
 Step 1 Step 2   
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable =  M_KPI Accuracy  Accuracy 
IO -0.004    
  (-0.051)    
IMR  -0.023**    
 (-2.222)   
     
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes 
     
Constant -6.544*** 0.344***  0.629*** 
 (-16.249) (3.181)  (5.163) 
     
Observations 32,457 31,502  31,502 
Pseudo R-squared 0.296 0.449  0.456 
 
This table reports the association between voluntary KPI disclosure and analyst earnings forecast accuracy. 





Table 17. The Effect of Voluntary KPI Disclosure Motivated by Analyst  Demand on Forecast 
Accuracy 
 Heckman  OLS 
 Step 1 Step 2   
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable =  M_KPI_Motivated Accuracy(t+1)  Accuracy(t+1) 
M_KPI_Motivated  0.055**  0.048* 
  (1.971)  (1.719) 
M_KPI  0.013  0.043** 
  (0.614)  (2.192) 
Accuracy  0.388***  0.388*** 
  (76.644)  (76.662) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs 1.400*** -0.115***  -0.055*** 
 (48.211) (-4.480)  (-3.327) 
M_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 1.923***    
 (12.795)    
Answer_KPI_PastQtrs_Dummy 0.169***    
 (4.316)    
M_PresentationWords 0.205***    
 (5.255)    
A_All_Questions_PastQtrs 0.054**    
 (2.060)    
PastRet  0.425***  0.425*** 
  (11.380)  (11.380) 
BVPS  -0.102***  -0.102*** 
  (-4.135)  (-4.122) 
SalesGrowth  -0.075*  -0.075 
  (-1.655)  (-1.644) 
Size -0.048*** -0.057***  -0.059*** 
  (-3.941) (-6.823)  (-6.983) 
Loss 0.028 -0.011  -0.008 
  (0.880) (-0.426)  (-0.331) 
Accruals -0.321** -0.416***  -0.410*** 
  (-2.115) (-3.789)  (-3.737) 
SUE -0.034 4.169***  4.166*** 
 (-0.220) (24.345)  (24.322) 
RetVol 0.560** -2.499***  -2.477*** 
  (2.508) (-13.754)  (-13.640) 
Leverage 0.091 -0.491***  -0.488*** 
  (1.629) (-11.226)  (-11.169) 
FollowingAnalysts -0.030 0.221***  0.224*** 
  (-1.167) (11.761)  (11.885) 
ROA 0.212 4.137***  4.128*** 




Table 17. (Continued) 
 Heckman  OLS 
 Step 1 Step 2   
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable =  M_KPI_Motivated Accuracy  Accuracy 
MB 0.004* 0.003**  0.003** 
 (1.900) (1.976)  (2.036) 
IO -0.088* 0.432***  0.430*** 
 (-1.907) (12.647)  (12.598) 
IMR  -0.045***   
  (-3.053)   
     
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes 
     
Constant -6.082*** 0.263**  0.110 
 (-16.510) (1.985)  (0.892) 
     
Observations 29,922 29,090  29,090 
Pseudo R-squared 0.332 0.472  0.472 
This table reports the effect of the voluntary KPI disclosure which happens in the aftermath of analyst 




Table 18. Subgroup Analysis for H3 (Eq.2 in Heckman specification) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent = Accuracy(t+1) Airline Energy Mining Real Estate Retail High-Tech 
        
M_KPI -0.117 0.224*** 0.429*** -0.116 0.122*** 0.077*** 
 (-0.361) (2.846) (2.724) (-1.211) (2.626) (3.255) 
Accuracy 0.080*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.258*** 0.071*** 
 (3.380) (5.613) (14.044) (5.840) (6.118) (23.191) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs 0.058 -0.098 0.541*** -0.561*** -0.180 0.004 
 (0.198) (-0.259) (3.019) (-2.908) (-1.330) (0.025) 
IMR -0.016 -1.013 -1.782*** -0.516** 0.691 2.174*** 
 (-0.091) (-0.555) (-2.762) (-2.044) (1.246) (3.368) 
       
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 1.284 -1.008 -0.197 0.040 -0.697 -2.743*** 
 (1.001) (-0.448) (-0.250) (0.100) (-1.255) (-4.351) 
       
Observations 654 4,382 967 282 6,255 19,466 
Pseudo R-squared 0.359 0.289 0.387 0.407 0.343 0.244 
 
This table reports subgroup analysis of the second equation in Heckman two-stage approach for each individual industry. The model regresses 
analyst forecast accuracy on managerial KPI disclosure. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***,**, and * 




Table 19. Subgroup Analysis for H4 (Eq.2 in Heckman specification) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent = Accuracy(t+1) Airline Energy Mining Real Estate Retail High-Tech 
        
M_KPI_Motivated  -0.118 -0.027 0.128 0.013 0.064 0.124*** 
 (-0.290) (-0.189) (0.864) (0.090) (1.455) (3.582) 
M_KPI  0.249 0.130 0.237* 0.038 -0.072 0.001 
 (0.543) (1.507) (1.666) (0.349) (-1.439) (0.054) 
Accuracy 0.172*** 0.370*** 0.314*** 0.247*** 0.386*** 0.392*** 
 (3.315) (26.757) (12.605) (6.809) (34.094) (59.884) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs 0.463 0.094 0.203 0.331* -0.171*** -0.090*** 
 (1.201) (0.990) (0.369) (1.970) (-3.148) (-2.945) 
MRI 0.260* -0.021 0.153 0.165** -0.024 -0.034* 
 (1.697) (-0.452) (0.355) (2.085) (-0.721) (-1.851) 
       
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 1.087 -0.646* -2.164 -1.200** 0.439** 0.159 
 (0.625) (-1.690) (-1.620) (-2.441) (2.076) (1.232) 
       
Observations 618 3,986 890 188 5,798 17,964 
Pseudo R-squared 0.375 0.337 0.399 0.577 0.375 0.237 
 
This table reports subgroup analysis of the second equation in Heckman two-stage approach for each individual industry.  The model regresses 
analyst forecast accuracy on managerial KPI disclosure. t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***,**, and * 




Table 20. Alternative Measures of Voluntary KPI Disclosure  
Test for  H3  H4 
Dependent Variable =  Accuracy(t+1)  Accuracy(t+1) 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
M_KPI_Words 0.035***     0.029**   
 (2.967)     (2.284)   
M_KPI_Mentions  0.018***     0.013*  
  (2.768)     (1.934)  
M_KPI_Persist   0.057***     0.035 
   (2.637)     (1.642) 
M_KPI_Motivated      0.047* 0.053* 0.060** 
      (1.699) (1.919) (2.225) 
Accuracy 0.389*** 0.389*** 0.382***   0.388*** 0.388*** 0.388*** 
 (79.219) (79.243) (79.129)   (76.647) (76.659) (76.629) 
A_KPI_PastQtrs -0.058*** -0.055*** -0.054***   -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.057*** 
 (-3.719) (-3.550) (-3.491)   (-3.481) (-3.361) (-3.407) 
         
         
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
         
Quarter & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant -0.306*** -0.319*** 0.180   -0.342*** -0.349*** 0.119 
 (-2.828) (-2.921) (1.494)   (-3.158) (-3.198) (0.973) 
         
Observations 31,502 31,502 31,502   29,090 29,090 29,090 
Pseudo R-squared 0.464 0.464 0.460   0.472 0.472 0.472 
 
This table reports the effect of the voluntary KPI disclosure on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy using alternative measures of KPI disclosure. t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
